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CHAPTER 12 
Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER • 
A. EMINENT DoMAIN 
§12.1. Premature announcement of taking: Right of owner to com-
pensation for property value loss. In Cayon v. City of Chicopee,1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with the problem of whether 
an owner of land should he compensated for the diminution of the value 
of his property resulting from announcements of its condemnation by a 
city agency which later failed to take the property. 
Under G.L. c. 79, §12, one whose property is actually taken by eminent 
domain is entitled to damages equal to the value of the land as of the 
time the recording of the order is made. Thus in cases where the value 
of the land has been inflated because of knowledge of the taking, the 
landowner has not been allowed the advantage of this increase in the 
property's value.2 The court in Lipinski v. Lynn Redevelopment Au-
thority3 held that since a landowner could not gain monetary advantage 
from knowledge of an upcoming taking, neither could he be disadvan-
taged by a decrease in the value of his property due to knowledge of the 
taking. In Alden v. Commonwealth,' the court was again confronted with 
the problem of general increases of land values created by the knowledge 
of a taking in the area. In this case the Commonwealth took the peti-
tioner's land to build Route 495 and its interchange with Route 9. The 
trial judge allowed into evidence as a "comparable" the purchase price 
of land adjacent to that of the petitioner but excluded testimony that 
the "dominant factor" which led to this purchase was the land's proximity 
to the anticipated project. The court in that case held that this exclusion 
• RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean of the Boston College Law School. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research and writing help of his two 
research assistants, Christopher C. Mansfield and John F. Natoli, in the preparation 
of this article. Their work was extensive and invaluable. 
§12.1. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1785, 277 N.E.2d 116. 
2 See, e.g., Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 3!18 Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209 (1959); Smith 
v. Commonwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 96 N.E. 666 (1911). · 
3 !155 Mass. 550, 246 N.E.2d 429 (1969), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.2!1. 
4 !151 Mass. 8!1, 217 N.E.2d 74!1 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§15.27, 
25.2. 
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was prejudicial and reasoned that only with careful limiting instructions 
might knowledge of the amount received on such a sale aid the jury's 
valuation, II Again, the court was expressing concern that the knowledge. 
of anticipated takings not unduly distort the value of the nearby land'l 
and thus not be improperly considered in the award given to a landowner. 
In Cayon, unlike the above cases, the land was never actually taken. 
The diminution in the value of the land in question resulted solely from 
announcements of takings which never transpired. However, the problem 
arising is somewhat similar to those posed by the above-mentioned cases. 
In all these cases, the court is called upon to consider what compensation 
a landowner should receive due to fluctuations in the value of his prop-
erty resulting from announced governmental intentions to take his land. 
For several years, the City of Chicopee and the Chicopee Redevelopment 
Authority had publicly announced that the petitioner's property was 
included in an urban redevelopment area and would eventually be taken. 
As a result of the announcements it was alleged that the sale and rental 
value of the petitioner's land decreased to such an extent that the peti~ 
tioner was unable to pay the taxes levied upon the property.6 The court 
was unwilling to accept the petitioner's argument that such action was 
taken pursuant to the eminent domain provisions of G.L. c. 79, §10. 
The court also rejected the petitioner's contention that the redevelopment 
authority's announcement deprived him of the use and enjoyment of his 
property in violation of the "due process" guarantees of the Massachu-
setts and United States Constitutions. The court held that the city's action 
in announcing that the petitioner's land would be taken for urban re-
newal purposes and then failing to execute the taking did not constitute 
a taking for which compensation should be paid 1 
The central question in the case was what constitutes a "taking" within 
the meaning of the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions. While 
the court recognized that a taking of private property could occur with-
out an actual physical invasion of the locus, it followed the traditional 
view that a physical disruption of some sort must occur before a com-
pensable taking can occur. As the court stressed: "Whether property has 
been taken for a public use so as to require just compensation is deter-
mined by the character of the invasion, not by the amount of damage 
suffered.''& With regard to premature public announcements of takings 
and the resulting decrease in the market value of the subject land, the 
court commented that "changes in value due to these causes are no more 
than incidents of ownership in a jurisdiction such as ours where all land 
is subject to the exercises of the power of eminent domain.''9 The court 
II !151 Mass. at 87, 217 N.E.2d at 746. 
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sb. at 1786, 277 N.E.2d at 117. 
7 Id. at 1787, 277 N.E.2d at 119. 
s Id. at 1789, 277 N.E.2d at 119. 
9 Id. at 1788, 277 N.E.2d at 119. 
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seemed to reject the petitioner's contention that interference with private 
property which destroys or lessens the value of property, at least in the 
present type of case, is the infringement of a right which the court should 
safeguard and recognize as involving a right under the law of eminent 
domain. 
The most persuasive argument advanced in denying the petitioner 
relief concerned the public policy of fostering such advance announce-
ments of intended takings so that all interested groups in the community 
might have ample opportunity to articulate their case for or against a 
proposed taking.1o The public benefit of full disclosure and public re-
sponse outweighs the detriment suffered by the landowners in the area 
designated for future taking. 
The difficulties in organizing urban renewal projects at present, in 
view of both federal and local procedures which must be complied with 
and the various hazards which must be overcome, can result in the hold-
ing of land in a type of economic-use limbo for lengthy periods of time. 
The Legislature might well consider adoption of a method by which, 
if land is held in a designated area for a certain period of time, com-
pensation would be paid for whatever reduction in economic worth 
occurred. This compensation would, it would seem, be based upon the 
difference in rental value of the land caused by the possible prospective 
taking. Thus a landowner, in the position of the one in the present case, 
could obtain some compensation if the holding period becomes unreason-
able. The community, or other taking agency, may have some greater 
costs in such a delayed taking but it would not seem unfair to make 
the public pay for the economic loss of a landowner that continues for 
a time beyond that ordinarily required for proper public announcements 
and consideration. 
§ 12.2. Taking of leasehold interest: Right of lessee to damages from 
taker. Universal Container Corp. v. City of Cambridge1 presented the 
question of whether a plaintiff lessee with a. recorded property right 
in premises taken by eminent domain has an independent claim for 
damages for loss of his interest, which is different from his right to re-
cover, from the lessor, a share of the amount paid to the lessor by the 
taking entity. In answering this question, the Supreme Judicial Court 
allowed the lessee's independent claim. 
The case involved a petition for assessment of damages under G.L. 
c. 79, §§14, 22, for a taking by the City of Cambridge of the petitioner's 
leasehold estate. The petitioner, who appealed from the trial court's judg-
ment for the respondent, was the sole tenant of land owned by the lessor, 
one Chapper, in accordance with a lease which ran from March 14, 1962 
10 Id. at 1790, 1J7 N.E.2d at 119. 
112.2 1 1972 Maas. Adv. Sh. 185, 278 N.E.2d 727. 
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to March 14, 1975. The petitioner operated a business on the land up to 
and including the date of taking. On August 19, 1968, the city took the 
land and made a lump sum payment to the lessor of $217,000. Although 
the city had constructive notice of the petitioner's recorded lease, the 
petitioner was not made a party to the transaction and was not com-
pensated for his leasehold interest, which was valued at $30,000. 
Adopting the logic of Kahler v. Marshfield,2 the Supreme Judicial 
Court reasoned that since payment to the lessor was made in violation 
of the lessee's recorded property right of which the city had constructive 
notice, the lessee was entitled to a direct recovery from the city. The 
Court held that the lessee was not limited to recourse against the lessor 
but had an independent claim against the city. a It was furthermore stated 
that the lessee's claim could not be extinguished by a settlement between 
the lessor and the city and that it was immaterial to the lessee's claim 
against the city whether or not the lessee could recover from the lessor.4 
In this decision and in the earlier Kahler case, the court has moved 
away from the rule allowing a lump sum payment to be awarded to the 
owner of the fee in an eminent domain taking and leaving those who 
hold separate interests to work out the division of the award amongst 
themselves in later proceedings. The new rule should not be used to 
avoid the standard policy that the total of damages payable upon a taking 
shall not, except in highly unusual circumstances, differ from the value 
determined as if the interest taken was held in sole ownership. But it will 
assure that all persons with interests in land taken by eminent domain 
have the opportunity to participate in the determination of damages. 
Attorneys for the taking agencies will thus have to examine the records 
carefully to be certain that all parties with interests in land being taken 
are included in the condemnation proceedings. Otherwise these agencies 
will be subjected to the risk of multiple suits and the further risk, at least 
on facts similar to those of Kahler, of having to pay overlapping damages. 
§12.3. Discretion of public officials: Allegations maintaining cause of 
action for abuse. In Richmond Brothers, Inc. v. City of Quincy1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court was presented with the issue of what constitutes 
sufficient allegations of specific facts to state a claim for abuse of official 
2 847 Mass. 514, 198 N.E.2d 647 (1964). 
a 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 185, 278 N.E.2d at 729. 
4 In the Kahler case the lessee could not recover the value of his leasehold interest 
from the lessor since the latter was bankrupt and the proceeds from the damage award 
were quickly "dissipated." Since the court in the instant case did not even consider 
the fact that the lessee might be able to recover a proportionate amount of the 
award from the apparently solvent lessor, it seems that whether or not the lessee 
can recover from the lessor is irrelevant insofar as his independent right of recovery 
against the city is concerned. 
§12.!1. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. !11!1, 279 N.E.2d 702. 
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discretion in an eminent domain taking. The court was unwilling to relax 
the strict rule set out in the recent cases of Poremba v. City of Springfield2 
and Moskow v. Boston Redevelopment Authority3 that to state a cause 
of action alleging that the primary purpose of a taking is not in the 
public interest, the bill must set forth specific allegations of particular 
facts supporting the inference that the taking was improper. Conse-
quently, it denied the plaintiff relief on the basis that his bill of com-
plaint failed to aver "unequivocally specific" facts to maintain a cause 
of action. 
The plaintiff's complaint in Richmond Brothers, which sought a de-
claratory decree that a taking by the city of Quincy of a parcel of his 
land was invalid, was based on the following allegations: On April 14, 
1969, the State Street Bank and Trust Company published a development 
plan which included the plaintiff's land within its development area. 
The bank did not own the plaintiff's land at this time but contemplated 
that it would eventually buy it. On August 22, 1969, the bank offered in 
writing to purchase the parcel from the plaintiff, but the plaintiff de-
clined the offer. On September 4 an attorney for the bank informed the 
plaintiff that if the offer was not accepted, the city would take the land. 
At a city council hearing held in June of 1970, the city made known 
the nature of its plans for a highway which was to be approximately 250 
feet long and which was to lead from a public highway through the land 
of the plaintiff to the development area of the bank. Finally, the City 
Council voted to take the plclintiff's parcel for "highway purposes" on 
August 13, 1970. The order was approved by the Mayor on August 19 
and recorded in the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds on September 18 
of that year. 
The plaintiff argued that the proposed public highway was in fact a 
private driveway access for the bank's project and that the primary purpose 
of the taking was thus private in nature. The plaintiff further maintained 
that the incidental public benefit to the employees and customers of the 
bank did not warrant the taking in eminent domain. On the basis of 
the alleged facts, the plaintiff urged that the court rule that the taking 
was primarily for the benefitof the State Street Bank and Trust Company 
and not for any overriding public purpose. Citing Poremba and Moskow, 
the court denied the plaintiff relief and held that the allegations set forth 
did not unequivocally describe action by public officers in bad faith or 
.nor did it allege facts sufficient to show that the taking of the plaintiff's 
property was for a private purpose.' 
A review of the fact situations in both Poremba and Moskow would be 
2 !154 Mass. 4!12, 2!18 N.E.2d 4!1 (1968). 
s !149 Mass. 55!1, 210 N.E.2d 699 (1965), cert. denied, !182 U.S. 98!1 (1966), noted in 
1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§ ll.8, 14.!11. 
' 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at !11!1, 279 N.E.2d at 70!1. 
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helpful in understanding the holding in the present case and in evaluat-
ing the court's general policy in this area. In Porembars the court denied 
the plaintiff declaratory relief in connection with a taking of his land 
for highway purposes. The plaintiff alleged that his land was taken not 
for any public purpose, but for the private benefit of one Albano who 
owned a large tract of business-zoned land contiguous to the parcels taken. 
The plaintiff alleged that prior to the taking Albano tried to buy the 
parcels and indicated that the city would take the parcels if he refused 
to sell. As in the Richmond Brothers case, the court sustained the city's 
demurrers to the plaintiff's bill of complaint on the basis that the plain-
tiff did not unequivocally set out facts showing a case presenting a sig-
nificant controversy. The court in Poremba stressed that wide discretion 
is entrusted in public officials and bodies charged with responsibility for 
takings in eminent domain. It stated that it was willing to review such 
discretion only when clear "allegations of underlying facts (as distin-
guished from conclusions)" have been stated which charge that a taking 
was not for a public purpose or that official action was in bad faith.e In 
both of these cases, the court found no such specific factual allegations. 
Nor were such specific allegations set forth in Moskow v. Boston Rede-
velopment Authority.T In that case the plaintiff also alleged that the 
primary purpose of a taking by the Boston Redevelopment Authority was 
not for a public purpose but to provide a site for a new office building 
to be occupied by a private bank. The plaintiff alleged that when the 
Authority proposed to take the defendant bank's building for an access 
route to the Government Center Project, the bank strongly protested and 
made a deal with the defendant authority. The alleged deal provided 
that the bank would withdraw its objection, try to purchase the plaintiff's 
property, and if successful, convey the property to a developer to erect 
upon the site a new tower building in which the bank could lease the 
first ten floors for its banking operations. The bank was then to sell its 
property in the proposed access route to the Authority reserving its right 
to possession until the new building was ready. The alleged agreement 
further provided that if the bank were unable to purchase the property, 
the Authority would take it by eminent domain to accomplish the terms 
aforementioned. Again, the Court found that the allegations were "broad 
generalities"& factually insufficient to sustain the complaint and com-
II 554 Mass. 4lJ2, 2lJ8 N.E.2d 4!J (1968). 
8 The court specifically held that: 
The. allegations concerning Albano's prior negotiations to purchase some of the 
aftected parcels and his indication that the properties would be taken, if not 
sold to him, do not contain specific facts sufficient to describe action by public 
officers or bodies in bad faith. 
Id. at 455, 2lJ8 N.E.2d at 46. 
T M9 Mass .. 55!J, 210 N.E.2d 699 (1965), cert. denied, lJ82 U.S. 98!J (1966). 
8 Id. at 564, 210 N.E.2d at 706. 
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mented that rhetoric was not an adequate substitution for allegations of 
specific facts. 9 
In Richmond Brothers, Poremba, and Moskow the court has indicated 
its strong reluctance to interfere with the wide discretion that has been 
delegated to officials and agencies in exercising their powers of eminent 
domain. Generally, one can agree with this policy. The proper exercise 
of delegated authority must generally be assumed in our complex society 
if government is not to be hindered in proceeding in the exercise of its 
powers. One might well question the wisdom of the court in the present 
cases, however, in setting such a high standard of specificity of alleged 
facts. Considering the covert nature of the alleged dealings in these cases, 
the various plaintiffs might never have access to sufficient information 
early enough in the litigation to withstand a demurrer. Whether an 
official or agency has acted corruptly, irrationally or without justifiable 
basis might become obvious only at trial or at least upon pretrial inter-
rogatories or depositions. The decisions of the court in these three cases 
may in some situations shield official abuse of power from redress by in-
dividuals when strong economic interests seek to ignore or override a 
landowner's constitutional rights. 
§12.4. Discretion of selectmen: Taking portion of locus when autho-
rization was for taking of entire locus. In Russell v. Town of Cantonl 
the issue presented to the Supreme Judicial Court was whether the order 
of a board of selectmen for a taking was invalid when the town authorized 
the taking of all of the plaintiffs' land and the board actually took less 
than all of it. Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the board's taking was valid in all respects and 
was authorized by the town meeting vote.2 
The plaintiffs in Russell owned 22 acres of land in Canton. By two 
separate deeds dated July 5, 1932 and January 23, 1964, they conveyed 
4.86 acres of their land to the town of Canton for use as a dump. On 
March 9, 1964, the town of Canton voted that "the sum of $36,000 be 
9 Id. at 562, 210 N.E.2d at 705. In this regard the court stated: "A most significant 
omission is any allegation that the members of the Authority were to the least 
extent involved in any negotiations with the bank or had authorized them or even 
knew about them." Id. The court also noted that: 
The negotiations said to have taken place among representatives of the bank, 
of the Authority, and of ••• [the developer] do not identify the representatives 
of anyone, and of the Authority in particular. We cannot supply an allegation 
that any representatives were authorized to bind the Authority to such . an 
"understanding" which the plaintiffs insist was improper. We do not construe 
these allegations as meaning that any member of the Authority was such a 
representative. We infer that none was. 
Id. at 564, 210 N.E.2d at 706. 
§12.4. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 941, 282 N.E.2d 420. 
2 Id. at 947, 282 N.E.2d at 42!1. 
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raised and appropriated . for the purpose of acquiring by eminent 
domain or by purchase, approximately 18 acres of land ... owned by 
William C. and Richard V. Russell ... for the purpose of extending the 
present [town] dump .... "8 On May 22, 1964, in accordance with the 
article adopted at the town meeting vote, the selectmen voted to take 
15.25 acres of the plaintiffs' land to extend the municipal dump and to 
award $30,500 plus a tax allowance as compensation for the taking. The 
petitioners refused to accept any part of the awarded damages and 
brought a bill in equity seeking money damages and specific affirmative 
relief against the town, the board of selectmen, and the treasurer and 
superintendent of the town's department of public works. The Superior 
Court found that the board of selectmen's taking was valid and conse-
quently dismissed the bill. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court the petitioners contended 
that the town vote expressly directed the board of selectmen to take all 
of their land and that the board had no discretion to take less than all 
of it.4 In rejecting this argument the court stated: "It is questionable 
whether a town meeting vote can operate to direct or command them 
[selectmen] in the discharge of their duties."11 The court cited several 
cases holding that towns may not direct public officers in the discharge 
of their statutory duties.6 It pointed out that although G.L. c. 40, §14 
requires that land that is to be taken by eminent domain must first be 
authorized by a town vote, the power to make the taking is ultimately 
vested in the discretion of the selectmen.7 While the town could authorize 
the selectmen to take real estate by eminent domain it could not direct 
or command them to do so. 
In the alternative the petitioners argued that if the town vote was an 
authorization and not a directive, it authorized only the taking of their 
entire property and not just a part of it. The court also rejected this 
argument on the ground that nothing in the warrant or vote of the town 
purported to state precisely the amount of land authorized to be taken, 
but rather estimated the extent of the authorized taking. Since the 15.65 
acres actually taken were included in the general language of the author-
ization ("approximately 18 acres of land"), the court felt that the board 
took no land that was not covered by the authorization. The court did 
not pass on whether a town's authorization could limit or condition a 
taking by the selectmen by express language requiring that the entire 
authorized parcel be taken. It limited itself to the facts of the case and 
a Id. at 942, 282 N.E.2d at 421. 
4 The warrant stated: "[A]nd that the Selectmen are hereby authorized and directed 
to acquire" the entire locus. (Emphasis added.) Id. 
5 Id. at 945, 282 N.E.2d at 422. 
6 See, e.g., Lead Lined Iron Pipe Co. v. Wakefield, 22!1 Mass. 485, 112 N.E. 2!17 
(1916); Breault v. Auburn, 30!1 Mass. 424, 22 N.E.2d 46 (19!19). 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 946, 282 N.E.2d at 42!1. 
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held only that the selectmen's vote was authorized by the town and valid 
in all respects. 
§12.5. Discretion of trial judge: Award of damages and motion for a 
new trial. In Loschi v. Massachusetts Port Authority,1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court, in a 4-3 decision, reaffirmed its policy of allowing a trial 
court judge almost complete discretion to grant or to refuse a new trial 
in cases of alleged inadequate or excessive awards of damages by a jury 
for eminent domain takings. The Massachusetts Port Authority made a 
taking of several contiguous parcels of petitioner's land with buildings 
located thereon in the East Boston area. In her petition for damages the 
petitioner testified that the fair market value of her property was $59,500 
and she evidenced detailed descriptions of her property with numerous 
color photographs. The respondent's expert witness, by use of the income 
capitalization method and by determining the rental value under this 
method for rents actually collected on the property, valued the property 
at $33,300. Notwithstanding the opinions of value introduced into evi-
dence, the jury returned a verdict for the petitioner in the amount of 
$76,000. 
The respondent argued that the judge abused his discretion in denying 
a motion for a new trial in view of the unusual jury action of granting 
a verdict so much greater than the highest opinion of value put into 
evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention and stated: 
"The judge's action will be reversed only where the damages awarded 
were 'greatly disproportionate to the injury proved' or where 'it appears 
to the judicial conscience ..• that otherwise a miscarriage of justice 
will result.' "2 While the court noted that Nichols on Eminent Domain 
states as a general proposition that damages for a taking should not be 
in excess of the amount claimed by the owner nor less than the lowest 
estimate offered by any witness,8 it did not read Nichols as stating a rule 
to which there are no exceptions. Thus it was held proper to set aside 
an award where there was a difference of opinion between the jury and 
the witnesses and where there was "other evidence" on which the jury 
may have independently reached its assessment of damages.' The majority 
of the court was unwilling to depart from the previously established 
policy of not interfering with the discretion of the trial judge to grant 
or refuse a new trial even under the extraordinary circumstances of this 
case. Accordingly, the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. The court reasoned that the 
color photographs and detailed information introduced into evidence by 
§12.5. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 925, 282 N.E.2d 418. 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 926, 282 N.E2d at 419, quoting, respectively, from Haven 
v. Brimfield, !145 Mass. 529, 584, 188 N.E.2d 574, 577 (196!1), and Bartley v. Phillips, 
!117 Mass. !15, 41, 57 N.E.2d 26, !10 (1944). 
8 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 117.!1 (!ld ed. 1969). 
' 1972. Mass. Adv. Sh. at 927, 282 N.E.2d at 419. 
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the petitioner, and the testimony of the Authority's expert, were "other 
evidence" by which the jury could properly haye concluded that the 
opinions of value introduced were disproportionately low.ll 
As noted above, three of the justices dissented on the basis that the 
verdict was not warranted by the evidence. On balance, however, the 
majority was probably correct in this case, even though the difference 
between the expert opinion and award actually made was so substantial. 
The landowner was not herself an expert so her opinion, although clearly 
admissible, has to be viewed as the opinion of one probably not as in-
formed on property values as a true expert might be. Moreover, the 
Authority's expert's use of an income capitalization method, particularly 
when based on actual rents received rather than on market value rents, 
is a trifle suspect.There seems less reason than in the usual case to apply 
the general rule stated by Nichols on Eminent Domain& since neither 
opinion of value was very compelling evidence and the other evidence 
may well have been more indicative of actual value. 
§ 12.6. Evidence of damages: Comparability and possibility of re-
zoning. In Lee v. Commonwealthl a petition for assessment of damages 
was brought, in superior court by one Lee for the taking of certain land 
owned by him which was located on Route 2 in Arlington where the 
municipal boundaries of Arlington, Belmont and Cambridge join. Al-
though the locus was zoned for residential use, the adjoining land on 
Route 2 in Cambridge was zoned and developed for business. A verdict 
and judgment for petitioner were returned in superior court in the · 
amount of $35,000. To this the Commonwealth filed a bill of exceptions 
which was concerned solely with several evidentiary rulings made by the 
superior court. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court the Commonwealth argued 
that the ability of the jury to arrive at a fair market value of the land 
was impaired by the trial judge's exclusion of certain documents which 
showed restrictive agreements that encumbered the land and thereby 
diminished its value. These agreements provided that if Star Market 
Company were the buyer of the land, the land would be free of restric-
tions, but if an outsider negotiated to buy the land, the market would be 
given up to forty-five days to meet the offer. In any case, if Star Market 
were not to meet the offer within the expiration of 45 days, the out-
sider could buy the land free of restrictions. The Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the forty-five-day delay would 
interfere substantially with the saleability of the land or considerably 
deter potential buyers from negotiating for the land. The court correctly 
II ld., 282 N.E.2d at 419-20. 
8 See 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 927, 282 N.E.2d at 419. 
§12.6. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 646, 281 N.E.2d 2!19. 
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held that these restrictions had only minimal effect on the fair market 
value of the land and their introduction in evidence might only have 
served to confuse the jury.ll 
The Commonwealth maintained, as its second objection, that it was 
error on the part of the trial judge not to strike the opinion of the 
petitioner's expert witness who partly based his opinion of the value of 
the land on the possible likelihood that the land would be rezoned for a 
business use. While the Commonwealth charged that the witness was in 
effect "rezoning the property on the witness stand," the Court held that 
there was no error since "the jury could warrantably find that a willing 
buyer's evaluation of the land could be influenced by the possibility of 
a change in zoning."a 
Nor did the court agree with the Commonwealth's third contention 
that the petitioner's expert was improperly permitted to use comparable 
land in Cambridge as a basis for his determination of the value of the 
petitioner's land in Arlington. The Commonwealth argued that although 
the Arlington land was separated from similar land in Cambridge only 
by an imaginary town dividing line, the value of the Cambridge land 
might be considerably different from that in Arlington since Cambridge 
is forced to minimize zoning restrictions and foster tax-yielding uses to 
compensate for all its tax exempt property.' Unconvinced by this argu-
ment, the court held that the trial judge's refusal to strike the opinion 
of the witness was in order and that the jury could properly find that 
the sales values were substantially comparable.& Apparently the court felt 
that any difference in zoning restrictions between the adjacent lands in 
Arlington and Cambridge was too insignificant a factor to warrant the 
exclusion of evidence of the sales price of similar nearby Cambridge land. 
The court was no more amenable to the Commonwealth's fourth argu-
ment that it was improperly restricted in the use of evidence showing 
unfavorable soil conditions on the land. Between the date of the taking 
in 1962 and the date when the evidence on soil condition was determined 
in 1969, th~ Commonwealth had placed fill on the property. The court 
affirmed the ruling of the trial judge that the evidence could not be 
properly admitted since the jury would have had no way of differentiating 
between the condition of the land in May of 1969, when the borings 
2 Id., 281 N.E.2d at 240. 
aId. 
4 More specifically, the Commonwealth argued that even though the petitioner's 
land was similar in almost every other respect to the adjacent land in Cambridge, 
the land in Cambridge was inherently more valuable as commercial property due to 
less stringent zoning restrictions in Cambridge. Thus, maintained the Commonwealth, 
the introduction in evidence of the value of the Cambridge land as· an index of 
value for the petitioner's land was improper and misleading. Id. 
II ld. 
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were made, from the condition of the land in 1962, when the land was 
taken. 
§12.7. Evidence of value: Comparability and Hatch Act limitations. 
In Quirk v. Town of Maynard,1 the Supreme Judicial Court, in a 
rescript opinion, upheld the admission of certain types of valuation 
evidence in the taking of land for water purposes. Between May 18, 1965 
and March 15, 1967, the Town of Maynard purchased water from the 
petitioners' land. In 1969 the town decided to take one portion of the 
locus (Lot A) for a water supply and another portion (Lot B) for a 
public domain to protect the water supply. The petitioners received 
a substantial verdict with respect to Lot A on their petition for assess-
ment of damages in the Superior Court. The jury returned a total verdict 
of $253,000 which was divided as follows: $175,000 for Lot A; $71,000 
for Lot B; and $7,500 for the loss of the use of Lot B between March of 
1967 and March of 1969. 
The town appealed from the verdict contending that Quirk and his 
expert based their opinions as to the value of the locus on inadmissible 
and improper grounds. At trial Quirk and his appraiser based their opin-
ions as to the value of the land on the cost to the town of one year's water 
from the locus projected over a period of ten to fourteen years. The town 
argued that this capitalization method of valuation did not represent 
the fair market value at the time of taking since both the demand for 
water by the town and the amount of water present were conjectural. 
The petitioners contended that their valuation method was proper as it 
reflected the income-producing capacity of the locus accurately in view 
of the town's need for water. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with 
the petitioners and held that the evidence was properly admitted at the 
discretion of the trial judge, since it had a direct bearing on the fair 
market value of the land as a source of water.2 
The town also contended on appeal that it was prejudicial error for 
the petitioners to testify that they had spent $15,000 for the installation 
of a temporary well and $22,000 for engineering costs in subdivision 
planning on the grounds that such testimony could lead to an unfair 
double recovery against the town for depriving petitioners of mutually 
conflicting uses of their land. The petitioners argued that it was the jury's 
prerogative to consider all uses to which the land was adaptable. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that this evidence was admissible since it 
was relevant to a determination of the fair market value of the locus.8 
The town also challenged the trial judge's allowing the petitioners to 
introduce in evidence, on cross-examination of the respondent's appraiser, 
the fact that certain sales of land near Lot A considered by the appraiser 
§12.7. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1325, 274 N.E.2d 342. 
2 Id. at 1325, 274 N.E.2d at 343. 
8 Id. 
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had a higher per acre value than the locus ·in question. The town main-
tained that this was prejudicial hearsay evidence since no effort was made 
to show that this nearby land was in any way similar to the locus. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a judge in his discretion could allow 
a witness to be asked on cross examination whether the sale of land in 
proximity to the locus had been at a higher unit price.~ However, the 
court commented that the judge in his discretion might appropriately 
have required preliminary proof of the comparability of Lot A to the 
other land.• 
The town also excepted to the trial court's refusal to grant several 
specific instructions. First, the town asked that the jury be charged not 
to consider any speculative future development of the land in awarding 
damages. The town argued that the judge should have instructed the jury 
not to i.ncrease damages by speculating that the petitioners might obtain 
authorization to carry water to neighboring towns in the future since the 
town's zoning by-law permitted water from the locus to be sold only to 
the town of Maynard Second, the town sought instructions that the jury 
not consider the market value of the water as such since only the town 
could legally buy the water. Third, the town contended that since the 
locus was largely a swamp, the jury should have been instructed on 
statutory restrictions on filling the locus since this directly affected the 
land's marketability. The petitioners argued that since all the evidence 
presented concerned the value of the water to the town of Majnard, no 
instruction was needed concerning the necessity for legislation to permit 
the petitioners to sell water to other towns. The petitioners maintained 
that since the income producing properties of the land had been estab-
lished, no instruction was necessary concerning future development of the 
land. The petitioners lastly contended that no instructions concerning 
the Hatch Act8 (containing prohibitions on the filling of swamp land) 
were needed as the locus was not a swamp. The court agreed with the 
petitioners on all counts and held that the trial judge's charge was 
adequate in view of the evidence presented and that there was an in-
suflicient basis in the evidence to require instructions with respect to 
the Hatch Act. 
§ 12.8. Agricultural lands: Expansion of exemption from taking un-
der eminent domain. Section 5B of G.L c. 79, which restricted the 
taking of certain agricultural lands! has been modified in several respects 
by chapter 148 of the Acts of 1972. The words "agricultural purposes" 
were replaced by the more precise language of "agricultural and farming 
as defined in" G.L. c. 128, §IA, and easements over such land were speci-
fically included within the ambit of the new statute. The evidence of the 
~ Id. 
II ld. 
e G.L. c. llJI, §117C. 
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availability of other land for taking for a public use has been limited by 
the requirement in chapter 143 that "occupied buildings" not be situated 
in the alternatively available land. The amendment also specifically added 
the requirement that the taking authority, if it accepts the landowner's 
evidence of the availability of other land, shall exempt the original land 
from the taking. 
The policy of this statute is somewhat doubtful since it is limited to 
takings by agencies other than the Commonwealth and since it excludes 
takings for highway purposes and takings ordered by the Department of 
Public Utilities. The change which prohibits the substitution of land on 
which occupied buildings are located for agricultural and farming land 
will also, as a practical matter, tend to limit the effect of this section. 
§ 12.9. Historic or ancient landmarks: Preservation by taking through 
eminent domain. Section 5A of G.L., c. 79, prohibits the taking of 
certain historic landmarks or other historic property except by specific 
leave of the General Court. Chapter 29 of the Acts of 1972 added a para-
graph to this section that permits the taking of property that has been 
certified by the Massachusetts Historical Commission as having historic 
interest, so long as it is not presently certified, owned or maintained by an 
historical organization or society. The taking may be by the Common-
wealth or by a city or town. The amendment clearly establishes that the 
taking must be for a public purpose and, by its requirement of certifica-
tion of its historic value, assures that no abuse will occur.1 
§12.10. Anti-snob zoning legislation: Constitutionality and coverage. 
The new Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act1 allows qmilified appli-
cants2 interested in building low income housingS to apply for a com-
prehensive permit4 in lieu of applying to all the local boards or officials 
§12.9. 1 One might claim that his property is of "historical interest" as a subter· 
fuge to get oondemnation proceeds for an otherwise unprofitable building or site. 
If he were successful public money would thus be wasted on property with little 
or no historical interest. Requiring certification by the Massachusetts Historical 
Commission assures that property taken will be of genuine historical interest. Presum· 
ably, the Commission has some expertise in the area and can accurately make a 
determination of genuine, bona fide "historical interest." 
§12.10. 1 G.L c. 40B, §§20-2!1, G.L c. 2!1B, §5A, inserted by Acts of 1969, c. 774, 
1§1, 2. For a discussion of this act, see Rodgers, Snob Zoning in Massachusetts, 1970 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 487; Huber, Anti-Snob Zoning Law, 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law !160; Sherer, Snob Zoning Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 Harv. 
J. Legis. 246 (1970). 
2 G.L. c. 40B, §20 defines "applicants" as "public agencies, non-profit oorporations, 
and limited dividend organizations." 
8 G.L c. 40B, §20 defines "low and moderate income housing" as "any housing 
subsidized by the federal or state government under any program to assist oonstruc-
tion .•• [of such housing] whether built or operated by any public agency or any 
nonprofit or limited dividend organization." 
4 See G.L. c. 40B, §21. 
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having jurisdiction over the proposed construction. The statute provides 
for the issuance of a comprehensive permit after a public hearing is held 
at which the opinions and recommendations are received of all the local 
officials who would have had jurisdiction except for the statute.5 If the 
board does not act within the statutory period,6 the application is deemed 
allowed and the permit is issued.7 Any person aggrieved by the issuance 
of a comprehensive permit may seek relief through traditional appeal 
channels.8 
If the local boat:d of appeals denies the application for a comprehen-
sive permit, or if it issues the permit with "uneconomic"& conditions, 
the applicant may seek relief by appealing to the Housing Appeals Com-
mittee of the Department of Community Affairs.1o The committee must 
conduct a full evidentiary hearing to determine if the board's action was 
"consistent with local needs."ll If the committee finds that the board 
acted contrary to local needs, it may order the board to issue the permit 
or modify its approval so as to remove the uneconomic conditions im-
posed.12 If the committee finds that the board acted correctly then it must 
affirm the decision.1s The committee's decision may in turn be reviewed 
in the superior court pursuant to G.L. c. 30A.14 
In Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee15 a 
qualified applicant filed with the Board of Appeals of Hanover an ap-
plication for a comprehensive permit to build eighty-eight units of low 
and moderate income housing for the elderly. After holding public hear-
ings,16 the board denied the permit and filed its report with the town 
li G.L. c. 40B, §21, inserted by Acts of 1969, c. 774, §I. 
6 G.L. c. 40B, §21 provides that the hearing will be held within thirty days of 
the receipt of the application and a decision will be rendered within forty days 
after the termination of the public hearing unless the time limit has been extended 
by mutual agreement of the applicant and board. 
7 G.L c. 40B, §21. . 
8 G.L. c. 40A, §21 permits any such aggrieved person to appeal to the district 
court within twenty-one days of the decision or to the superior court within twenty 
days. 
9 See G.L. c. 40B, §20 for a definition of "uneconomic." 
10 G.L c. 40B, §§22-23 grants this alternative appeal opportunity; G.L. c. 23B, 
§5A establishes the Housing Appeals Committee. 
11 G.L c. 40B, §20 includes explicit mathematical formulae for determining the 
maximum land area a community with a demonstrated need for low and moderate 
income housing must devote to such housing; it also indicates that the regional need 
for such housing shall be considered as the local need by the board and by the 
committee. 
12 G.L c. 40B, §23, created by Acts of 1969, c. 774, §I. 
18 ld. 
14 G.L. c. 30A is the State Administrative Procedure Act. 
15 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 491, 294 N.E.2d 393. This case is extensively treated in a 
student comment in § 12.30 infra. 
16 Public hearings are required by G.L. c. 40B, §21, and G.L. c. 40A, §17. 
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clerk, stating the reasons for the denial.lT In December of 1970, the 
applicant appealed to the committee which, after public hearings, over-
ruled the board and ordered issuance of the comprehensive permits sub-
ject to specified conditions.1s The board then filed bills for review in the 
superior court.19 The superior court judge reserved his ruling on the case 
and reported it to the Supreme Judicial Court.2o 
The case, which was the first to test the Anti-Snob Zoning Act, 
presented the following issues to the Court: (1) whether chapter 774 
confers power upon the committee and the boards to override zoning 
regulations which hamper the construction of low and moderate income 
housing; (2) whether such power to override zoning regulations, if it 
exists, is constitutional; and (3) whether the exercise of such power by 
the committee in the present case was proper, or was, on the contrary, 
an impermissible form of spot zoning.21 
The petitioner boards of appeals, both from Concord22 and Hanover, 
questioned their own and the committee's power to override or modify 
local zoning by-laws which inhibit the implementation of chapter 774. 
They contended that the Legislature enacted this chapter merely to 
provide a "streamlined procedure for processing applications for the 
necessary local approvals of construction of low and moderate income 
housing."2a The respondent committee, on the other hand, argued that 
the text, history, and context of the chapter showed a clear legislative 
intent to allow both the board and the committee to ignore any local 
by-laws that prohibit the construction of such housing which is "consis-
tent with local needs." In addressing itself to this issue, the court entered 
into a lengthy examination of the legislative history of chapter 774,24 
and ultimately disposed of the question by concluding that the primary 
purpose of the chapter "was to provide relief from exclusionary zoning 
practices which prevented the construction of badly needed low and 
moderate income housing."2li 
With this legislative intent in mind, the court proceeded to interpret 
the ambiguous passages of the chapter that were in controversy.26 The 
boards argued that the Legislature's failure to specify that local zoning 
lT For a list of these reasons, see 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 492 n.l, 294 N.E.2d at 
400 n.l. 
18 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 520 n.22, 294 N.E.2d at "416 n.22. 
19 Suit was brought under G.L. c. 40B, §22 and G.L. c. 30A, §14. 
20 The Supreme Judicial Court's decision encompassed not only the Hanover case, 
but also a similar case in which a comprehensive permit had been denied by the 
Board of Appeals of Concord. 
21 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 494, 294 N.E.2d at 401. 
22 See note 20 supra. 
23 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 496, 294 N.E.2d at 402. 
24 See id. at 496-503, 294 N.E.2d at 402·07. 
215 Id. at 502, 294 N.E.2d at 406. 
26 Id. 
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ordinances could be ignored if they were inconsistent with local needs 
indicates that no power to override local ordinances or by-laws was con-
ferred. In this respect the boards contended that the phrase "requirements 
and regulations" as it appears in G.L. c. 40B, §20 should not be construed 
to include local zoning ordinances or by-laws. The court disagreed, how-
ever, and ruled that "requirements and regulations," include local zoning 
by-laws which will be applicable if they are "consistent with local needs" 
and ignored or modified if they are not.27 By implication, the court ruled 
that the boards as well as the committee have the same power to over-
rule or modify zoning by-laws, for if the boards did not have this power 
the initial application would be a meaningless gesture. Further, to "avoid 
a construction of statutory language which produces irrational results",28 
the court construed G.L. c. 40B, §21, which grants the board the power 
to issue permits and approvals, as not excluding the additional powers 
to override local requirements and regulations conferred by sections 22 
and 23.29 Since the board's interpretation of chapter 774 would com-
pletely negate the legislative intent, the court rejected it and held instead 
that the chapter confers on both the boards of appeals and the Housing 
Appeals Committee the power to override local requirements and regu-
lations, including zoning by-laws, which are not "consistent with local 
needs," as well as the power to issue comprehensive permits in lieu of 
other permits which would be required were it not for the special pro-
cedure prescribed in the chapter.so 
The second of the petitioners' arguments focused on the relationship 
of chapter 774 with the Home Rule Amendment of 1966.81 Prior to 1966, 
there was no question that the state legislature was "supreme" in matters 
of zoning. The boards and an amicus curiae contended that the adoption 
of the· Home Rule Amendment prevents the General Court from inter-
fering with local zoning ordinances and that it invalidates all pre-1966 
decisions regarding state supremacy in zoning. 
The court sought to resolve this issue by ascertaining the source of 
local authority to adopt zoning ordinances subsequent to the passage 
of the Home Rule Amendment. It concluded that zoning power is one 
of a locality's independent municipal powers permitted by the amend-
ment which provides for adoption of ordinances or by-laws for the pro-
tection of public health, safety, and general welfare. But this power is 
not to be exercised "inconsistently with the laws enacted by the general 
27 See G.L. c. 40B, §23. 
28 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 503, 294 N.E.2d at 407, citing Johnson v. Comm'r of 
Pub. Safety, 355 Mass. 94, 99, 243 N.E.2d 157, 160 (1968). 
29 1973 -Mass. Adv. Sh. at 503, 294 N.E.2d at 407. 
<IO ld. at 503..()4, 294 N.E.2d at 407. 
. 81 Mass. Const., Articles of Amendment, art. II, section I (§104), as amended by 
art. LXXXIX (§235) (1966) of the amendments. For a discussion of the Home Rule 
Amendment, see 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§16.2-.7. 
17
Huber: Chapter 12: Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
§12.10 LAND USE 419 
court in conformity with §8."32 Section gsa provides in relevant part: 
"the general court shall have the power to act ... by general laws which 
apply alike to all cities .... " Thus, while municipalities can pass zoning 
by-laws, these by-laws must not frustrate the purpose of implementation 
of general or special laws enacted in accordance with section 8. Hence, 
said the court, chapter 774 does not violate the Home Rule Amendment 
since it is a general law which applies to all cities and towns in the 
Commonwealth. a• 
The amicus curiae311 argued that if the local board overrode local 
zoning by-laws in favor of local needs, it would be engaging in illegal 
spot zoning. In rejecting this contention, the court relied on the test 
for spot zoning stated in Lamarre v. Fall River.86 That test hinges on a 
determination of whether there was "a singling out of one lot for dif-
ferent treatment from that accorded similar surrounding land indis-
tinguishable in character, all for the economic benefit of the owner of 
that lot."B7 Under that test, "spot zoning is deemed objectionable only 
when the economic gain of an individual property owner is the sole result 
of a spot zoning change. Conversely, if the public welfare is also served 
by any spot zoning, then such zoning is permissible. The question is 
thus to determine whether the special treatment afforded to qualified 
applicants under chapter 774 serves the public welfare. In the Lamarre 
case, the court found that zoning changes to promote the construction 
of multi-family dwellings in a city with housing shortages promoted the 
public welfare. as Likewise, in Henze v. Building Inspector of Lawrence}9 
the court held that the need for low and moderate income housing 
justified the re-zoning of a particular parcel.'O The regional need for 
housing had also been demonstrated in the instant case so that it could 
properly be said that reclassification to encourage low and moderate 
income housing would definitely promote the general welfare. In addi-
tion, the court observed that chapter 774 contains satisfactory standards 
(i.e., "consistent with local needs") as well as ample provisions for review 
to safeguard the public's interest in any overriding of local zoning by-
laws.41 It can thus be said that the exercise of chapter 774 power to over-
32 Mass. Const., Articles of Amendment, art. II, section 6 (§104E), as amended by 
art. LXXXIX, §6 (§235) (1966). 
38 Mass. Const., Articles of Amendment, art. II, section 8 (§104G), as amended by 
art. LXXXIX, §8 (§235) (1966). 
3• 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 508, 294 N.E.2d at 410. 
311 Newton Civic and Land Association. 
36 324 Mass. 542, 87 N.E.2d 211 (1949). 
37 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 510, 294 N.E.2d at 410, quoting Lamarre, 324 Mass. at 
545-46, 87 N.E.2d at 213. 
88 324 Mass. at 546, 87 N.E.2d at 215. 
89 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 902, 269 N.E.2d 711. 
40 Id. at 903, 269 N.E.2d at 712. 
•1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 511, 294 N.E.2d at 411. 
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ride local zoning by-laws which are inconsistent with local needs does not 
constitute illegal spot zoning.42 
The boards further claimed that chapter 774 was unconstitutionally 
vague because its provisions fail to give standards sufficient to guide ad-
ministrative action, and that the Act itself makes provision for an 
improper delegation of legislative power. The court dealt with both 
challenges simultaneously by applying the standard test of vagueness, 
namely, whether the statute is so vague that "men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."'8 
Such vagueness could lead to arbitrary and capricious administrative 
action in violation of due process." In upholding the constitutionality 
of chapter 774, the court viewed the Act as a whole and reasoned that a 
board is to use the same standards in reviewing an application as is the 
committee in reviewing the boards' decisions, namely, whether the appli-
cation is "consistent with local needs" and whether contemplated condi-
tions imposed on the permit would be "uneconomic.""1 If a board's deci-
sion does not reflect the same standards used to judge the decision on 
appeal to the committee, then the initial application to the board would 
be a meaningless requirement. The court also cited ¢.e detailed defini-
tions of relevant terms set out in section 20 of the Act in dismissing the 
vagueness claim. The court dismissed the impermissible delegation of 
power argument by citing several cases in which broader delegations 
of power and less definite standards were held to be constitutional." 
The boards' next argument centered on the procedural implementation 
of the statute. Specifically, they questioned whether the statute authorized 
a de novo review by the committee of an application for a permit. The 
Hanover Board claimed that the committee was empowered only to 
decide whether the result reached by the board was justified by the 
evidence. The Concord Board argued that the review should be a "re-
examination . . • for the purpose of preventing a result not based on 
unbiased and reasonable judgment."'7 Both boards argued that the com-
mittee review should not be a de novo hearing. 
'2 Most state and federal courts agree that spot zoning is permissible where it 
alleviates a demonstrated housing shortage. See 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 511 n.16, 294 
N.E.2d at 411 n.16. 
's Id. at 511, 294 N.E.2d at 511, quoting Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 825 Mass. 
519, 521, 91 N.E.2d 666, 667 (1950), and O'Connell v. Brockton Bd. of Appeals, 844 
Mass. 208, 212, 181 N.E.2d 800,. 808 (1962). 
44o See, e.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 885 (1929); Commonwealth v. 
Carpenter, 825 Mass. 519, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950). 
4,~; G.L c. 40B, §20. 
'6 See, e.g., Burnham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester, 888 Mass. 114, 128 N.E.2d 
772 (1955), noted in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 1§1.8, 18.8; MacGibbon v. Board of 
Appeals of Duxbury, 856 Mass. 685, 255 N.E.2d 847 (1970), noted in 1970 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§17.2, 26.1. 
'7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 516, 294 N.E.2d at 414. 
19
Huber: Chapter 12: Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
§12.10 LAND USE 421 
The court rejected these contentions by noting that the committee 
must render a written decision ("facts, conclusions, and reasons therefor") 
and make a stenographic record of the hearing.48 In order to fulfill its 
legislative mandate, the committee is required to determine whether the 
board's decision was consistent with local needs. In order to do so, said 
the court, a de novo evidentiary hearing was the proper procedure since 
it is possible that the board might have overlooked vital considerations 
as being irrelevant.49 
The boards next argued that the alternative methods of review afforded 
to applicants and to aggrieved parties violated the equal protection 
guarantees of both the Massachusetts and the United States Constitu-
tions. The court dismissed this argument by finding that there was no 
substantial difference between a de novo evidentiary hearing before the 
committee and the traditional hearing before a court.11o 
The Hanover Board then contended that the committee exceeded its 
authority in ordering the board to issue a comprehensive permit with 
conditions that (1) stated that sanitary facilities must be approved by 
the appropriate state authorities, (2) empowered the board to require 
the applicant to make disclosure of its leasing arrangements, and (3) set 
no time ·limits for completion of the project.li1 The court, citing G.L. 
c. 40B, §21, disagreed, stating that since the committee had the power 
to order the board to issue the permit, and since the board had the 
power to place conditions on the issuance of the permit, the committee's 
order to the board to issue the permit with conditions was valid.u In 
making its argument, the Hanover Board mistakenly relied upon Weld 
v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester,11B in which the court ruled that a board 
of appeals had over-stepped its statutory authority in attaching certain 
conditions to a special permit. The court in Hanover stated that while 
certain conditions may be so vague as to be constitutionally impermissible, 
no such vagueness or lack of definitiveness could be found in the con-
ditions attached to the comprehensive permit granted in the instant case. 
The last of the petitioners' arguments concerned the sufficiency of 
evidence upon which the committee based its decisions to reverse the 
boards. The court answered the petitioners in a lengthy, unsympathetic 
examination of the evidence before the committee in which it disagreed 
with each contention of lack of substantial evidence. In doing so, the 
court eliminated the last obstacle to affirming the committee's decision. 
48 G.L. c. 40B, §22. 
49 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 518, 294 N.E.2d at 415. 
110 The court essentially nullified this argument by previously ruling that the 
review by the committee under chapter 774 must be in the form of a de novo evi-
dentiary hearing. 
Ill 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 520 n.22, 294 N.E.2d at 416 n.22. 
112 Id. at 522, 294 N.E.2d at 417-18. 
118 M5 Mass. 376, 187 N.E.2d 854 (1963), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 1§12.4, 
13.4. 
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In concluding its opinion, the court made the following statement 
with citation to the case of Simon v. Needham . ..r.• 
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up a 
barrier against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens who 
desire to live there . . • nor for the purpose of protecting the large 
estates that are already located in the district. The strictly local 
interests of the town must yield if it appears they are plainly in 
conflict with the general interests of the public at large, and in such 
cases the interest of "the municipality would not be allowed to 
stand in the way." [Citations omitted.] 
The judicial response to the housing shortage and exclusionary zoning 
was that chapter 774 was a "reasonable means to serve a legitimate pur-
pose" and that the provisions of the- Act were properly implemented in 
the instant proceeding.~~~~ The decisions of the Housing Appeals Com-
mittee were thus affirmed in both the Hanover and Concord cases. 
§12.Il. Public hearing on adoption of urban renewal plan: Legisla-
tive rather than adjudicatory. The Park Plaza project in Boston has 
been, and no doubt will be for some time to come, the subject of political 
and legal dispute. One of the issues raised in this continuing battle 
between partisans and opponents was determined in Duncan v. Acting 
Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs.l The issue 
before the court was whether the public hearing required by the sixth 
paragraph of G.L. c. 121B, §48 contemplates an adjudicatory proceed-
ing as defined in G.L. c. 30A, §1(1). The critical provision of section 48 
is as follows: -
The department of Community Affairs may hold a public hearing 
upon any urban renewal_ plan submitted to it, and shall do so if 
requested in writing within ten days after submission of the plan 
to the urban renewal agency, by the mayor or _city council of the 
city .•. in which the proposed project is located, or twenty-five or 
more taxable inhabitants of such city ...• 
The court held that the text of section 48 indicates that the proceeding 
contemplated is not adjudicatory and that the findings required by the 
statute strongly suggest that the appropriate type of hearing is legislative.2 
On July 15, 1971, the Boston Redevelopment Authority approved the 
Park Plaza Urban Renewal Project plan and submitted it to the mayor 
II! llll Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1952). 
1111 For judicial responses from other jurisdictions, see 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 5llll, 
294 N.E.2d at 42!1. 
§12.11. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 284 N.E.2d 245. 
2 Id. at 1212, 284 N.E.2d at 247. 
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and city council of Boston. In December of 1971, both the city council 
and the mayor approved the plan. The authority then submitted the 
plan to the Department of Community Affairs on January 13, 1972. In 
accordance with G.L. c. 121B, §48, the petitioners, who are owners of 
residential and business property within the project area, made a request 
for a public hearing on the plan. On January 27, 1972, the petitioners 
requested that the department conduct the hearing as an adjudicatory 
proceeding. The department refused the request and announced that 
the hearing would be held on February 9, 1972. The petitioners then 
sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the department from 
holding the hearing unless it were conducted as an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding. On February 9, a judge of the superior court ordered that a 
permanent injunction be entered against the hearing scheduled for that 
day. The hearing was recessed following the service of the order. The 
respondents filed petitions on February 11, 1972, praying that the order 
be vacated and that the court hear argument concerning the nature of 
the proceeding. The petitions were allowed and the order vacated on 
February 14, 1972. The intervening respondents included in their answers 
prayers for a declaratory judgment that the proposed public hearing 
was not adjudicatory. After a hearing, a second superior court judge 
granted this prayer and the petitioners appealed. 
In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the 
facts of the case in light of the standards set out in G.L. c. 30A, §1(1), 
for an adjudicatory proceeding. According to that statute: 
An adjudicatory proceeding means a proceeding before an agency 
in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named 
persons are required by constitutional right or by any provision of 
the General Laws to be determined after opportunity for an agency 
hearing. 
With regard to the subject hearing in the present case, the court posed 
two questions: first, whether the rights of specifically named persons 
were to be determined; and second, whether the determination was re-
quired to be made after an opportunity for an agency hearing. 
The petitioners argued that the rights, duties, and privileges of four 
classes of "specifically named persons"3 were to be determined and that 
if any of these fit the definition in section 1(1), they would be entitled 
to an adjudicatory proceeding under section 48. The court agreed that 
the city and the redevelopment authority were specifically named persons 
under G.L. c. 30A, §1(4), and had a right under section 48 to have their 
s The four classes mentioned by the court were the city, the authority and its 
designated redeveloper, the twenty-five or more taxable inhabitants of the city and 
the owners and tenants in the project area. The petitioners were included in the latter 
two groups. 
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rights, duties or privileges determined.4 However, the court distinguished 
the rights, duties and privileges to be determined on these facts from 
those contemplated in Section 1(1): 
But the rights, duties, and privileges in question are those of a public 
agency acting in its capacity in proposing a broad social program. 
Whatever might be the situation if the city asserted rights as a cred-
itor or property owner, we do not think a proceeding becomes 
'adjudicatory' merely because it may affect the public, political or 
legislative functions of the city."11 
The court considered the rights of the authority and the designated 
redeveloper to be the same as those of the city.6 
The court thereupon viewed the legal rights, duties, or privileges of 
the twenty-five or more taxable inhabitants as no greater than those of 
any taxpayer who shares a general public interest in a city's financial 
affairs. Taxpayers' suits were regarded as a "classic form" of action that 
is taken to vindicate public, not individual private, rights.7 It can there-
fore be stated as a general proposition that taxpayers' rights to request 
a hearing on a public issue do not require an adjudicatory proceeding. 
The court thus distinguished between the general rights of a taxpayer 
and the legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named persons 
contemplated by section 1(1). 
The court admitted that the private rights of the owners and tenants 
of the land in the project area were most clearly affected by the proceed-
ings under section 48. However, the Court did not determine whether 
theirs were the "legal rights" of "specifically named persons." It avoided 
this question by pointing out that, since section 48 does not specifically 
require that opportunity be given to them for an agency hearing 
before the plan is considered by the Department of Community Affairs, 
the statute does not fall within section 1(1). Irrespective of whether the 
rights involved were those of specifically named persons within the mean-
ing of section 1(1), the landowners and tenants were not entitled to 
an adjudicatory proceeding under section 48, since it contained no 
provision for a prior agency hearing as to them before the approval of 
the plan. 
The court also commented that the list of findings required by sec-
tion 48 was a further indication that the proceeding contemplated was 
not adjudicatory. Under section 48, 
[f]indings are not required with respect to such "adjudicative facts" 
as "the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1216, 284 N.E.2d at 247-48. 
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properties," as "who did what, where, when, how, why, with what 
motive or intent," or as "the kind of facts that go to a jury in a 
jury case."B 
The court also found that the legislative history of section 48 is not in 
any way contrary to its decision.9 
The Duncan case is, of course, more of an administrative law case 
than a purely urban renewal one. But the holding that a section 48 
hearing is not adjudicatory, at least not necessarily so, does point out 
the political and thus the legislative nature of urban renewal. While it 
was recognized that the land owners and tenants in the project area could 
be "clearly affected" by the section 48 hearing, it was nonetheless held 
that the statutory pattern of that section provides for a required public 
hearing only if requested by the mayor or city council or by twenty-five 
or more taxable inhabitants. No part of that section requires a public 
hearing at the request of land owners and tenants in the project area 
who may be the ones individually affected. The thrust of section 48 
concerns the vindication of public interests rather than private rights 
and thus does not fit into the, section 1(1) requirements for an adjudi-
catory hearing. 
§12.12. Regional planning: Extension of coverage and public hear-
ing requirements. Chapter 361 of the Acts of 1972, in amending G.L. 
c. 40B, §5, updates that section to reflect a growing awareness of social 
and public problems in the zoning area. Section 5, which governs the 
powers and duties of the regional planning commissions, has not been 
amended since its original adoption in 1955. The new language of that 
section adds the word "problems" to the list of those factors which each 
regional commission must consider in regard to its own district before 
it takes action. Thus the coverage of a commission's investigations is 
inaeased over and above its traditional function of considering only the 
"resources," the "possibilities" and the "needs" of the district over which 
it has jurisdiction. "Necessary" (as differentiated from the prior "advis-
able") studies of district plans are to be undertaken, "governmental" im-
provement of the district is added to "physical," "social" and "economic" 
improvements as the goals to be achieved, and a new stress is laid upon 
the best interests of the "inhabitants" of the district rather than the 
district itself. Also, rather than attempting to enumerate every area to 
be included in the board's plans and recommendations, the new act uses 
broader language, i.e., "public utilities," "public facilities," "public 
places," and "public institutions," in an effort to extend coverage to as 
many areas as possible in promoting the general welfare and prosperity 
of the district's people. 
a Id. at 1215, 284 N.E.2d at 249. 
II It also cited numerous cases in other jurisdictions that support its decision, with 
only one case to the contrary. Id. at 1217, 284 N.E.2d at 250. 
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Apart from this attention to the general needs and welfare of the 
population within the district, perhaps the most important aspect of 
the statute is the addition of new notice and hearing provisions. These 
guarantee to the inhabitants of the district at least one public hearing 
before the adoption of any regional plan and require notice of the time, 
place and subject of the hearing. Written notice is to be given to each 
planning board, board of selectmen, and city council within the district. 
Notice of the time, place and subject of the hearing is also to be pub-
lished ten days before the hearing in a newspaper having substantial 
circulation in the region. 
§12.13. Improperly approved plan: Rescission limitations. In Bing-
ham v. Planning Board of North Reading,! the individual plaintiffs, the 
Binghams, owned land subdivided into seventeen house lots under a 
subdivision plan approved by the respondent planning board in Janu-
ary of 1961. The plaintiff Melrose Savings Bank held the mortgage on 
the land. In March of 1951, the town adopted a zoning by-law which 
provided that the minimum lot size in the area of the locus was 15,000 
square feet. The town increased this minimum lot size to 20,000 square 
feet in 1955 and then to 40,000 square feet in March of 1960. In December 
of 1954, the Binghams applied for a permit to sudivid.e their land and 
submitted a definitive plan to the board. In April of 1955, the planning 
board voted its approval of the Bingham's plan which contained lots of 
less than the 20,000 square feet minimum. In September of 1960, the 
Binghams filed with the planning board another petition for the sub-
division of the land in question and also executed several covenants that 
they would install certain public utilities on the land within two years. 
Although none of the lots in the plan contained 40,000 square feet, the 
planning board again approved the Binghams' subdivision plan in Janu-
ary of 1961. By September of 1962, the two-year covenapts signed by the 
Binghams had expired, and they then executed a second covenant for 
another two years. In January of 1963, the 1960 plan was recorded in 
the Registry of Deeds. 
In December of 1963, the Binghams borrowed $40,000 from the Mel~ 
rose Savings Bank and executed a mortgage to the Bank on the land 
covered by the plan. It was later found that the Bank acted in good faithl 
in granting the mortgage which was recorded in December of 1963. In 
January of 1965, the Binghams executed a third covenant to complete all 
ways and to install all municipal services and in December of that year 
they executed a fourth covenant which was later extended to January of 
1968. In December of 1966, the Binghams took out a successor mortgage 
on the property with the Melrose Savings Bank, thus discharging the 
first mortgage on the property. 
§12.1!1. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1!1!1!1, 285 N.E.2d 408. 
2 Id. at 1!154, 285 N.E.2d at 409. 
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In October of 1967, the respondent planning board voted to rescind 
the approved plan on two grounds: first, the original approval was in 
violation of the town's then existing zoning by-law; and second, the 
Binghams failed to comply with the conditional covenant dated December 
of 1962 which required them to complete all ways and to install _all 
municipal services on the subdivided land within two years. 
The superior court reversed the board's decision to rescind its prior 
approval given in January of 1961 and ruled that any breach of the 
covenant had been waived by extensions granted by the board in the 
later covenants. The lower court further ruled that the bank, having 
granted a mortgage on the property in good faith and in reliance on 
the records, was entitled to the protection afforded by G.L. c. 41, §81W 
which states: 
No .•. rescission of the approval of a plan of a subdivision or 
change in such plan shall affect the lots in such subdivision which 
have beim • . . mortgaged in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration subsequent to the approval of the plan, or any rights 
appurtenant thereto, without the consent . . • of the holder of the 
mortgage or mortgages, if any, thereon. 
Having found that the board acted in excess of its authority in rescinding 
its approval, the court ordered the board to rescind its vote purporting 
to invalidate the subdivision plan. 
On appeal, the planning board raised several issues. The board argued 
that even if the 1960 plan was properly approved, the plan expired by 
the terms of the covenant executed by the parties to the plan and 
recorded in the Registry of Deeds. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed 
with the Binghams, however, and found that subsequent extensions 
granted by the board in later covenants served to waive this condition.8 
The board also argued that the 1960 plan was properly rescinded because 
it did not meet the applicable area lot size requirements in effect in 
September of 1960. The board argued that since the plan, when approved, 
was in violation of the town's zoning by-law, it had a right to rescind 
the earlier approval. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the rescission 
was a nullity since the bank's consent was mandatory under G.L. c. 41, 
§81W.' The court reasoned that irrespective of the reasons the board 
might have had for rescinding its prior approval, it had to follow the 
statutory procedures and obtain the bank's consent. Lastly, the board 
questioned the standing of the Binghams to question its decision to 
rescind approval. In interpreting G.L. c. 41, §81BB,11 the court found 
3 Id. 
'Id. 
II G.L. c. 41, §SlBB states in relevant part: "Any person •.• aggrieved •.• by any 
decision of a planning board concerning a plan of subdivision .•• may appeal to the 
superior court sitting in equity • • ." 
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that the Binghams were within the class of persons "aggrieved" by the 
board's decision, and that they therefore had standing to bring suit. 
In reaching its decision the court insisted that section SIW of G.L. 
c. 41 be interpreted literally and adhered to exactly. While one can 
sympathize with the present plight of the planning board, it clearly 
had created the situation by its earlier approval of the plan in violation 
of the town's zoning by-laws and its extensions of the original covenants 
to complete the ways and utilities installations within two years of the 
date of approval. The opinion thus stands as a caution to planning boards 
that they not place themselves in positions in which rescission is desirable 
but cannot be obtained. 
§12.14. Subdivision subject to conditional approval: Time limits. In 
Costanza b Bertolino, Inc. v. Planning Board of North Reading,t the 
Supreme Judicial Court faced the issue of whether the respondent plan-
ning board had exceeded its authority in refusing to endorse the peti-
tioner's plan with the notation "approval under the subdivision control 
law not required." The board found that the plan constituted a sub-
division under G.L. c. 41, §SIP, for which approval under the Subdivision 
Control Law was required, and thus refused to make the endorsement. 
In September of 1960 one Lucci submitted a definitive plan2 to the 
board. The board signed the plan and endorsed it as "conditionally ap-
proved in accordance with G.L. c. 41, §SIU, as shown in the agreement, 
recorded herewith."8 The agreement was a covenant providing for the 
construction of all ways and the installation of all municipal services 
within two years. Failure to fulfill this agreement, it was stated, would 
result in the automatic rescission of the plan's approval. In March of 
1962, Lucci executed a second covenant identical in its terms to the 
earlier one. One week after executing this second covenant, Lucci sold the 
lots in question to the plaintiff Costanza. 
Costanza submitted his plan on April 3, 1969 and requested the board 
to endorse it as not requiring approval under the Subdivision Control 
Law. Although the lots shown on the Costanza plan were identical with 
those shown on the conditionally approved Lucci plan, the planning 
board declined to endorse it. On appeal the Superior Court held that 
the board's decision was null and void and ordered the board to endorse 
the plan as requested by the plaintiff. This decision was reversed by 
the Supreme Judicial Court. 
Costanza argued that sections SIL and SIP of G.L. c. 41 supported 
his request for endorsement of his plan. Section SIL provides that 
§12.14. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 189!1, 277 N.E.2d 511. 
2 See G.L. c. 41, §SIS which describes preliminary plans and the definitive plans 
which evolve therefrom. 
a 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1894, 277 N.E.2d at 512. 
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the division of a tract of land into two or more lots shall not be 
deemed . . • a subdivision . . . if . . . every lot within the tract so 
divided has frontage on ..• (b) a way shown on a plan theretofore 
approved and endorsed in accordance with the subdivision control 
law. 
Section SIP provides that 
if the board finds that the plan does not require such approval, it 
shall ... endorse thereon ... 'approval under the subdivision control 
law not required' .... Such endorsement shall not be withheld unless 
such plan shows a subdivision. 
Costanza argued that the prior approval of the Lucci plan brought his 
plan within the terms of clause (b) of section SIL. He stated that his 
scheme fit within this exception since the plan consisted of a portion of 
lots shown on a definitive plan approved and endorsed by the planning 
board in 1960. However, as the Supreme Judicial Court noted, the plan 
he referred to was in fact only "conditionally approved" in accordance 
with an accompanying agreement. The Court found that this agreement, 
which required the construction of all ways and municipal services within 
two years, was a condition that had to be met in order for approval to 
be complete. • It further ruled that the covenant fixing a time period for 
completion of the work was consonant with the purposes of the Sub-
division Control Law. Section SIU(l) specifically permits a planning 
board to set a time limit when imposing a bond or deposit to insure the 
completion of construction and installation of the facilities and services 
required in a conditionally approved plan. While Section 81U(2), refer-
ring to the imposition of covenants to insure performance, does not 
specifically mention a time limit, the court held that the Legislature 
could not have intended any difference in result as to time limits among 
these methods of accomplishing the required construction.11 The court 
found that the board acted within its authority in refusing the requested 
endorsement because the approval of the plan, being conditional, was 
rescinded when the condition was not met. It was thus held that the 
property did not fit within the exception of subsection 81L(b)6 and that 
it for that reason constituted a subdivision.'f 
The result in this case was, as the opinion indicates, the only sensible 
one. To permit the imposition of time limits under one method of secur-
ing performance, and not to permit it under another, would result in a 
4 Id. at 1895, 277 N.E.2d at 513. 
II ld. 
8 The exception in subsection 81L(b) is for those lots within a tract which have 
frontage on a way shown on a plan previously approved and endorsed in accordance 
with the Subdivision Control Law. 
1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1895, 277 N.E.2d at 514. 
28
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/15
480 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §12.15 
disturbance that has no justification as far as the differenCe of the 
method· used is concerned. In the broader policy sense, planning boards 
should be permitted to require prompt development of subdivisions to 
assure that paper subdivisions, created a number of years earlier, do 
not continue to have legal effect and thus bar a more satisfactory use 
of land in accordance with land .use policies as they develop in the 
community. 
§12.15. Amendments: Spot zoning. In 1970 the town meeting of 
Rockland adopted an amendment rezoning a particular locus from resi-
dential to limited business. In Martin v. Town of Rockland,l the plaintiff 
sought a declaratory judgment under G.L. c. 231A, that this amendment 
was invalid on the ground that the town had exceeded its statutory 
authority in adopting the zoning change.2 The plaintiff appealed from a 
judgment of the superior court upholding the validity of the amend-
ment. The Appeals Court found that since the locus in question was 
situat~ between a business district and a residential district, the par-
ticular parcel could be zoned as either residential or commercial depend-
ing upon the wishes of those voting at the town meeting. 8 So long as 
the classification chosen bore a rational relation to public convenience 
and welfare, and was a logical use for the land, there could be no chal-
lenge to its validity. The Appeals Court supported its finding by empha-
sizing that zoning is a matter appropriately dealt with by municipal 
legislation. The wisdom of the local voters cannot be challenged unless 
it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the amendment conflicted 
with the enabling act.4 
The plaintiff's argument that the amendment constituted spot zoning 
was dismissed by the court since there was no singling out for special 
.treatment any one lot indistinguishable hom others in the same zoning 
district. II The locus was distinguishable from other lots in the same district 
because of its proximity to the established business districts8 and its dis-
tance from other residentially zoned property in the area. The zoning 
change was thus a reasonable extension of the existing business district.' 
The court therefore refused to substitute its judgment for that of the 
town. 
§12.15. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 179, 294 N.E.2d 469. 
2 The statutory authority for zoning changes can be found in the Zoning Enabling 
Act, G.L c. 40A. especially 1§2, 5. 
8 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 180, 294 N.E.2d at 471. 
4 Id. See also Launer v. Board of Appeals of Tewksbury, M8 Mass. 220, 202 N.E.2d 
610 (1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.1. 
II 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 180, 294 N.E.2d at 471. See also LGnner, M8 
Mass. at 229-50, 202 N.E.2d at 619. 
8 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 180, 294 N.E.2d at 471. See also Peters v. West• 
field, 555 Mass. 655, 2M N.E.2d 295 (1968), noted in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.2. 
'l 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 180, 294 N.E.2d at 471. See also Peter1, !155 Mass. 
at 658, 2M N.E.2d at 298. 
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.Ar. far as can be determined from the court's opinion, the suit in this 
case should not have been brought in the first place. Precedent has 
firmly established the right of Massachusetts communities to rezone 
parcels of land that are sufficiently different from similarly zoned adjoin-
ing land so that the communities' judgment cannot be considered either 
arbitrary or unreasonable. Some states require a finding of a change in 
conditions or a previous error in the original zoning before an amend-
ment can be validly adopted but Massachusetts has never adopted such 
an unduly restrictive view of municipal legislative powers. 
§12.16. Special permit: Discretion in granting. The discretionary 
decision of a board of appeals in denying a special permit was presented 
to the Appeals Court in Pioneer Home Sponsors Inc. v. Board of Appeals 
of Northampton.1 Pioneer had applied for a special permit to construct 
a development of multi-dwellings. After a public hearing the board 
denied the application despite the fact that Pioneer had met all the 
conditions set forth in the relevant section of the city ordinance.2 The 
superior court judge, erroneously assuming that the board's function 
was limited to mechanically determining if the technical requirements 
were met by the applicant, reversed the decision of the board. The 
intervenors brought this case before the Appeals Court claiming that 
unless the city zoning ordinance were interpreted in its entirety the 
board would be effectively stripped of its discretionary power to grant 
or deny special permits. 
The city's ordinance explicitly provides, in a section other than the 
specific one relating to multi-dwelling permits, that special permits 
"shall be in harmony with . . . general intent of the ordinance," and 
it adopts the statutory phrasing of G.L. c. 40A, §4, which provides that 
a board "may, in appropriate cases ... grant ... a special permit .... " 
Hence, the board's power to grant or deny special permits is discretionary 
even though the facts show that technically a permit could be lawfully 
granted. Absent any evidence that the board acted whimsically, unreason-
ably, or on a legally untenable ground, its decision must stand.a The 
case was remanded to the board for further consideration in light of 
the court's opinion, with an indication that a further public hearing 
could be held at the board's discretion. 
§12.17. Special permit: Consultation with planning board. In 
Caruso v. Pastanl the Appeals Court was confronted with the issue of 
the propriety of the granting of a special permit2 by a local board of 
§12.16. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 427, 297 N.E.2d 7!1. 
2 Section 12f of the Northampton zoning ordinance. 
a 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 428, 297 N.E.2d at 74. 
§12.17. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 29, 294 N.E.2d 501. 
2 See G.L c. 40A, §4, which deals with "special permits." 
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appeals after it had privately consulted with the local planning board 
following the conclusion of the required public hearing. In 1970 the 
Saugus Board of Appeals issued a special permit that exempted a pro-
posed apartment complex from meeting certain provisions of the town 
zoning by-law.a The plaintiffs, who were nearby landowners, appealed 
this decision to the superior court which found the proposed construction 
to be "in complete harmony with the ... intent of the by-law."' The 
trial judge also found nothing to suggest that the board's action was 
"unreasonable, whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary,''11 and refused to alter 
the decision of the Saugus board. The Appeals Court also refused to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the local board in the absence of a clear 
showing of legal insufficiency of supportive evidence or whimsical or 
capricious decision-making. e 
In Caruso the applicant met all the procedural requirements for obtain-
ing the special permit. After the conclusion of the public hearing, the 
board of appeals met with the planning board, which had jurisdiction 
over the locus under the Subdivision Control Law.1 At this meeting, 
which was conducted without the knowledge of either the applicant or 
the plaintiffs, the members of the two boards discussed the imposition of 
an unconditional requirement on the permit that a particular sewer 
connection be made, and that a performance bond be posted to insure 
completion of the plan as submitted and approved. The merits of the 
special permit application were apparently not discussed at this meeting. 
The Appeals Court noted the impropriety of such a meeting prior to 
the issuance of the board of appeals' decision but did not find that this 
was sufficient legal grounds for overturning the decision. Hence, the 
board's grant of the special permit was upheld. 
The Appeals Court ignored the extensive argument of the plaintiffs 
that contested the wisdom of the board's decision, and limited its deci-, 
sion solely to the issue of improper consultation. It is arguable that the 
deference shown the local board's decision represents a rather careful 
limitation of the strict compliance with the standard of review set up in 
Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline. a Josephs required that in review-
ing grants of special permits, the superior court must hear the matter 
a The "planned unit development" was allowed to vary the by-Jaw provisions of lot 
sizes, usable land area, percentage of lots oovered, street frontages, and proximity of 
off-street paiidng. 
' 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at !10, 294 N.E.2d at 502. 
II Id. at 81, 294 N.E.2d at 502. 
6 Id. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 855 , Mass. 275, 
277, 244 N.E.2d 811, 818 (1969), and cases cited therein, noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §14.9. 
T G.L. c. 41, §181K-81GG. 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1405, 285 N.E.2d 486, noted in 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§122.11, 22.12. 
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de novo, determine the validity of the board's decision based on facts 
found by the court, not give evidentiary weight to the board's decision, 
make findings which do more than trace statutory language, and find 
affirmatively that each statute and ordinance has been complied with.9 
On balance, however, there seems to be no disagreement with the find-
ings of both the board of appeals and the superior court that the special 
permit was precisely the type the local by-law permitted in planned unit 
development. 
The court also noted that the sewer connection condition and the 
requirement of a bond were not within the power of the board of appeals 
but were more properly under the decision-making authority of the 
planning board.10 Since the applicant did not, however, contest these 
provisions, and since this exercise of a power not granted to the board 
could in no way affect the plaintiffs adversely, the court chose not to 
strike down the conditions but to leave them intact.u 
It is submitted that this opinion should be read narrowly. Although 
the board of appeals' consultation with the planning board was improper, 
it did not relate to the decision as to whether or not to grant the permit, 
but only to two conditions that were imposed upon the applicant. Con-
sequently, it constituted insufficient grounds for invalidating the decision. 
One may assume that illegal consultation that relates to a decision itself 
would not be permissible. At least, a prudent board of appeals should 
not expect a court to uphold consultation that has a direct effect on the 
decision to grant or deny a permit. As a de novo policy matter, one might 
well argue that such consultation should not only be warranted but, for 
purposes of integrated development, required in the consideration of a 
proposal for a planned unit development or any other complex develop-
ment in which both local boards are required to act. But as the court 
properly found, the law at present is to the contrary. Legislative consider-
ation of this policy question would be desirable, but public hearings 
should be held if any such consultation is required or even permitted. 
§12.18. Amendment of board of appeals decision: Effect on original 
denial. In Potter v. Board of Appeals of Mansfield} the petitioner 
Potter applied in August of 1970 for a special permit to build a sixty-
nine unit apartment complex. The board of appeals denied the special 
permit, after compliance with the statutory notice and hearing require-
ments,2 on November 3, 1970 and recorded the decision with the town 
clerk on November 17, 1970. The petitioner did not seek judicial review 
9 Id. at 1409, 285 N.E.2d at 439. 
10 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 30, 294 N.E.2d at 502. 
11 Id. at 31, 294 N.E.2d at 503. 
§12.18. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 97, 294 N.E.2d 587. · 
2 G.L c. 40A, §§4, 17, 18. 
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within the statutory period allowed for appeals.8 The board, on Decem-
ber 1, 1970, before the statutory appeals period had expired, rendered an 
amended decision which included concrete reasons for its denial of the 
special permit. A copy of this decision was not filed with the town clerk's 
office until January 25, 1971.4 The petitioner filed a revised plan with 
the board on January 25, 1971, which he claimed met all the require-
ments set forth in the revised decision. The board refused to issue a 
special permit on the ground that the November 3, 1970 decision was 
final and appealable, and that the board had lost jurisdiction in the case, 
and that the December 1, 1970 amended decision was of no legal force 
or effect.5 
Potter then sought a writ of mandamus to compel further action by 
the board of appeals on his revised application for a special permit. He 
chose to file the present action for a writ of mandamus rather than file 
for a new application since a town meeting had voted zoning changes 
which prohibited the desired use. The town meeting had taken this 
action subsequent to the original application and prior to the board's 
refusal to consider the amended application. 
The Appeals Court ruled that the original decision of November 3, 
1970, was to be construed as the final decision, that the December 1, 
1970, amended decision was of no force or effect, and that the present 
mandamus action was, therefore, barred by Potter's failure to pursue 
the exclusive remedy of judicial review provided by section 21 of the 
Zoning Enabling Act.6 The court found that nothing suggested that the 
board intended any further proceeding after taking the case under 
advisement at the conclusion of the first hearing. By qualifying their 
decision with the words: "disapprove ... until ... planning board 
approval [is] obtained," the board of appeals made the effort to meet 
the requirements of the zoning by-law,7 which provides that reasons for 
denial must be given, and G.L. c. 40A, §18, which also requires reasons 
for a decision. The petitioner claimed that the above phrase should be 
read as an expression of present intention to approve a future application 
if that application should be approved by the planning board, without 
future consideration by the zoning board of appeals. However, to give 
the above words the meaning claimed by the petitioner would necessarily 
lead to one of two illegal conclusions: either an improper delegation of 
its power to the planning board of determine if requirements for granting 
8 G.L. c. 40A, §21 allows twenty days for an appeal to the superior court and 
twenty-one days for an appeal to the district court. 
4 See G.L. c. 40A, §18, which provides that the decision should be filed within 
fourteen days of the proceeding. 
II 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 100, 294 N.E.2d at 589. 
6 Id. at 101, 294 N.E.2d at 590. 
7 Section V F1 of the Mansfield roning by-law which was enacted to meet the 
requirements of G.L. c. 40A, §18. 
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the permit were met, or an attempted conditional grant of a permit on 
consideration of plans and other evidence not before the board.8 
A board of appeals may amend its decisions by the filing of additional 
reasons9 as long as no one is prejudiced by the late filinglo and the 
amendment does not change the result of the original decision.u In the 
present case the amended decision could not be given its claimed effect 
of conditionally granting the permit since the permit application was 
specifically denied by the original decision. Nor, alternatively, could the 
amended decision have been construed as an entirely new decision, since 
the notice and hearing requirements of G.L. c. 40A, §§4, 17, and 18 were 
not met. 
Once the court had properly determined that the amended decision 
could not be effective either as a conditional permit, an amendment to 
the first decision, or an entirely new decision, that decision ceased to 
have any effect except as a means of stating reasons for the original denial 
of the permit. Thus, the original decision had to be appealed under the 
Zoning Enabling Act's exclusive method of judicial review,12 and since 
it was not, Murphy was precluded from obtaining relief by mandamus 
in the present ~ction.1s 
§12.19. Building pennit: Action to avoid effect of zoning amendment. 
In Murphy v. Board of Selectmen of Manchester,l the Appeals Court 
considered the effect of section 11 of the Zoning Enabling Act.2 In 
January of 1965, a building permit was issued to the plaintiff Murphy's 
predecessor in title, authorizing the construction of fifty-four apartment 
units. Sometime after June of 1965, construction began on twenty-four 
of the authorized units and was substantially completed by May of 1966. 
In August of 1966, amendments to the Manchester by-laws caused the 
proposed construction to be in violation thereof. The issue presented 
to the Appeals Court was whether the permit was still effective in light 
of the new zoning amendments. The court ruled that failure to comply 
literally with the provisions of G.L. c. 40A, §11, which exempts building 
permits from the effect of zoning amendments, invalidated Murphy's 
authorization to construct the remaining thirty apartment units.8 
8 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 102, 294 N.E.2d at 590. 
9 Dion v. Board of Appeals of Waltham, 344 Mass. 547, 552-53, 183 N.E.2d 479, 
482-83 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§12.7, 13.2. 
10 Shuman v. Board of Aldermen of Newton, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 963, 968-69, 282 
N.E.2d 653, 659. 
11 Fish v. Building Inspector of Falmouth, 357 Mass. 774, 775, 258 N.E.2d 743 
(1970). 
12 G.L c. 40A, §21. See also Lincoln v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, !146 
Mass. 418, 193 N.E.2d 590 (196!1), noted in 1964 Aim. Surv. Mass. Law §14.4. 
13 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 104, 294 N.E.2d at 592. 
§12.19. 1 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 485, 298 N.E.2d 885. 
2 G.L. c. 40A. 
8 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 485-88, 298 N.E.2d at 886-88. 
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Section II provides that 
no zoning ordinance or amendment thereof shall affect any permit 
issued or construction lawfully begun before notice of the hearing 
[on the proposed ordinance or amendment] ... or before the issu-
ance of the warrant for the town meeting at which such by-law is 
adopted . . . provided that construction work under such permit is 
commenced within six months after its issue, and . . . proceeds in 
good faith to completion so far as reasonably practicable under the 
circumstances. 
During 1966 Murphy leveled off a section of land known as the Stone 
Mill property and did some preliminary excavation work on some of the 
other buildings. The court held, however, that this type of activity did 
not qualify as construction as that word is used in section II.' 
The petitioner also argued that construction of the first twenty-four 
units satisfied the six-month requirement of section II and that two legal 
actions caused the delay in construction of the remaining authorized 
units. Murphy further urged that further construction while legal actions 
were pending would not have been "reasonably practicable under the 
circumstances." The court ruled that the petitioner had not proceeded 
in "good faith continuously to completion" as provided in section II, 
since the two legal actions cited for the construction delay were both 
instituted by the petitioner.~! Neither of the two suits could reasonably 
be said to have any bearing on the long delay in construction; the first 
suit, brought to confirm title, was completed in August of 1966, while 
the outcome of the second action, concerning a right of way, would have 
had no material effect on the location or construction of any proposed 
buildings. 
While the court declined to allow actions to confirm title or rights of 
way instituted by the permit holder to have such a tolling effect, it con-
ceded that certain types of litigation might delay the effect of time periods 
under section I 1.6 However, to qualify as a special "circumstance" under 
section II, the litigation must be such as can be characterized an incident 
of the construction process.7 To allow delays for any and all litigation 
would mean that the effects of zoning amendments could be thwarted 
' 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 486, 298 N.E.2d at 887. See also Alexander v. 
Building Inspector of Provincetown, 350 Mass. 370, 214 N.E.2d 876 (1966), noted in 
1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.11. 
l! 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 487-88, 298 N.E.2d at 887-88. 
6 The court indicated that an appeal from the issuance of the permit or from 
litigation enjoining the construction would be examples of such actions with tolling 
effects. 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 487-88, 298 N.E.2d at 887. 
7 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 488, 298 N.E.2d at 888, citing Papalia v. Inspector 
of Buildings of Watertown, 351 Mass. 176, 179, 217 N.E.2d 911, 914 (1966) (noted in 
1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.10). 
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for years. The court also noted that when, as in the Murphy case, the 
permit covered a number of buildings, the six-month period might well 
be applicable to each of the buildings. Since, however, the court found 
that the six-month period had not been complied with as to any of the 
units in the group of thirty apartments, it was not necessary to decide 
this issue. 
§12.20. Appeal from decision of board of appeals: Standing as "per· 
son aggrieved." The question of standing in a zoning appeal under G.L. 
c. 40A, §211, was presented to the Appeals Court in Amherst Growth 
Study Committee, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst.2 The plaintiff 
was an organization formed after the board's decision to grant a special 
permit but before the appeal period had expired. The plaintiff com-
mittee claimed to he the successor to an organization which had opposed 
the development in question. The plaintiff neither held an interest in 
property nor had any express purpose other than to oppose the proposed 
development. Since th<! plaintiff was unable to establish any legal rights 
in either the pleadings or the evidence at the trial, the court affirmed the 
interlocutory decree dismissing the plaintiff's bill. 
In reaching its decision, the Appeals Court relied on Circle Lounge 
and Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston,3 which denied standing 
to the owners of a restaurant who sought review of the granting of a 
variance to a competitor. In, Circle Lounge and Grille the Supreme Judi-
cial Court found that, despite the fact that the plaintiff would be in-
jured4 by the granting of the variance because of increased competition 
and possibly increased congestion and litter, it was not a "person ag-
grieved" entitled to appeal under G.L. c. 40, §30.15 The court continued 
its policy of restricting access to judicial review to those persons with 
legally recognizable injury, and it declined to find that a landowner in 
a commercial zone could sustain a legally recognizable injury by way of 
reclassification of other nearby land as commercial. 
In support of its ruling, the court also cited Sierra Club v. Morton,6 
a landmark decision in which the plaintiff was denied standing in a suit 
§12.20. 1 G.L. c. 40A, §21 grants "persons aggrieved by the decision of the board 
of appeals" opportunity to appeal that decision to either the district or superior court 
within twenty-one or twenty days, respectively. "Persons aggrieved" specifically includes 
"any municipal officer, planning board, or city council." See 19 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §22.7. 
2 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 394, 296 N.E.2d 717. 
8 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949). 
4 In the Circle Lounge case, the Howard Johnson Company was granted a variance 
to build a restaurant approximately 400 feet from the plaintiff's restaurant. The 
plaintiff alleged legal interest in that the competition would reduce his profits. The 
court replied with the comment that zoning laws were not intended to promote 
monopolies. 
6 G.L c. 40, §30 was the predecessor of G.L c. 40A, §21. 
6 405 u.s. 727 (1972). 
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brought by it to prevent the commercial development of certain recre-
ational areas. The United States Supreme Court, while admitting that the 
interest alleged may have reflected "aesthetic, conservational, and recre-
ational as well as economic values,"' denied the status of an aggrieved 
party to the Sierra Club. The Court closed the door on all special interest 
groups regardless of how firmly they were established or how noble was 
their cause unless they alleged legally recognizable injury to the group or to 
some of its members. It was noted, however, that once standing has been 
established, the plaintiff is free to argue the interests of the general 
public in support of his position. 
This rescript opinion of the Appeals Court precludes special interest 
groups (or individuals) from enforcing their iJ:idividual value preferences 
through the judicial process unless they can show a direct, legal interest 
in the subject matter of the case. Only if they can show such a direct, 
legal interest will they be able to seek judicial review in zoning appeal 
cases. To be considered "aggrieved" a party must have special interests 
affected that are different from the general rights of the public. It is, of 
course, possible for municipal agencies (e.g., planning boards, municipal 
officers, and city councils)& in appropriate cases to represent general 
public interests but no unofficial private parties are given this recognition 
under the Zoning Enabling Act. 
§12.21. Appeal from grant of special permit: Availability of manda-
mus. The question presented ~o the Appeals Court in Saab v. Building 
Inspector of Lowelll was whether mandamus can be used to attack the 
grant of a variance (or special permit) after the statutory appeal period 
has expired. At some time prior to the present action, the Board of 
Appeals of Lowell granted two valid variances for the construction of an 
apartment complex. Saab did not appeal from these actions of the board 
although he apparently was entitled to do so as a person aggrieved. 
Having failed to avail himself of his appeal rights within the statutory 
time limit, Saab then brought a motion to intervene in an appeal brought 
by other aggrieved parties in the superior court. This motion was denied 
and Saab did not appeal from the denial. The petitioner, Saab, then 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the building inspector to revoke 
the building permits for the apartment complex which was then under 
construction. The respondent building inspector demurred on the 
grounds, inter alia, that a remedy will not lie in mandamus actions when 
other effective remedies are available. The trial court sustained the 
demurrer and Saab appealed. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the demurrer, ruling that the petitioner 
1 Id. at 7!18. 
8 See note 1 supra. 
§12.21. 1 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 95, 294 N.E.2d 458. 
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had forfeited his rights by ignoring the statutory avenues of appea1.2 
The petitioner's argument that alternative remedies were not available 
was somewhat ludicrous since he had neglected two obvious statutory 
appeal channels. 
The Appeals Court distinguished the Saab case from the earlier deci-
sions in Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport3 and Gamer v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of Newton.' In Brady the petitioner sought enforce-
ment of a zoning ordinance by a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court ruled that Mrs. Brady's failure to treat a letter from the town 
counsel as an appealable decision of the building inspector did not 
foreclose the traditional public right to seek immediate enforcement by 
mandamus.11 In Gamer the plaintiffs had only five days to appeal from 
the building commissioner's denial of a permit.8 The Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that this was an unreasonably short appeal period and that 
under the circumstances mandamus relief was appropriate.T The Appeals 
Court viewed the present case as one in which the traditional appeals 
procedures were readily available and fully adequate, unlike the Brady 
and Gamer cases in which traditional appellate routes were non-existent 
or unreasonable. The court thus affirmed the order sustaining the 
demurrer and dismissed Saab's bill for a writ of mandamus. 
This case rather briefly but apparently correctly answers the question 
that the Brady case left unanswered, namely, whether the failure to use 
the statutory appeal route from the grant of a variance or a special 
permit bars a later appeal by way of mandamus upon the issuance of a 
building permit granted under such variance or special permit. The 
language of Brady can be interpreted to permit this "second chance" 
approach.8 The entire philosophy of the short appeal time, however, 
would seem to be to establish finality for the decisions in these cases. 
Thus, even if mandamus might otherwise seem appropriate under general 
principles governing its application, the Zoning Enabling Act should be 
interpreted so as to bar this second route of attack on decisions otherwise 
unappealable under the statutory terms. 
2 Id. at 96, 294 N.E.2d at 459. 
3 !148 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d 51!1 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.15. 
' !146 Mass. 648, 195 N.E.2d 772 (1964). 
II !148 Mass. at 522, 204 N.E.2d 517-18. 
8 Since that time the appeal time has been extended to thirty days. See G.L. c. 40A, 
§16 as amended by Acts of 196!1, c. 207. 
'1 !146 Mass. at 649, 195 N.E.2d at 774. 
8 The language referred to is: 
We hold that an aggrieved person may by appeal to the board under [G.L c. 40A] 
§lll seek the review of a written decision that there is no violation of law in the 
facts complained of, but if he does not do so he does not lose his right as a 
citizen to invoke the public right of immediate law enforcement." 
!148 Mass. at 52!1, 204 N.E.2d at 518. 
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§12.22. Time for appeal: Jurisdictional or procedural issue. In 
Lynch v. Board of Appeals of Boston,t the Appeals Court ruled that the 
time limit set for an appeal to the board of appeals from the denial of 
a permit by the building commissioner is a procedural and not a juris-
dictional issue.2 The question of whether an appeal was timely taken 
must thus be initially litigated at the trial level. The time limits on 
these facts are to be regarded as merely procedural devices to aid in the 
administration of the zoning ordinance. 
One of the defendants in the Lynch case, Living and Learning Center, 
Inc., applied for a building permit to construct a day nursery in a single-
family district. The application was denied by the building commissioner 
on February 24, 1971 on the grounds that the proposed rear yard depth 
was insufficient and that a day nursery was a conditional use in such a 
zoning district. A timely appeal8 was taken from this denial but was 
subsequently withdrawn without prejudice on April 16, 1971, since no-
tice of the required public hearing had not yet been published. On May 
14, 1971, the building commissioner refused the defendant's application 
a second time, again on the same grounds. On May 17, 1971, a second 
appeal was taken from the building department's decision. After a public 
hearing and assurances from Living and Learning Center, Inc. that the 
dimensions of the rear yard would be increased, the board of appeals 
approved the conditional use of a nursery school.4 Lynch and other 
affected property owners appealed this decision to the superior court, 
which upheld the board's approval of the conditional use. 
The plaintiffs contended that the board lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal from the building commissioner's denial. Their argument was 
based upon section 8 of the Boston Zoning Code5 which provides in part 
that "any person aggrieved by reason of being refused a permit ... may 
appeal to said board of appeal within forty-five days after such refusal, 
order, or decision by paying to the building commissioner a fee. . . ."8 
The plaintiffs argued that the appeal was null and void since it was filed 
after the expiration of the statutory forty-five day appeal period. Since 
this issue was not raised in the pleadings at the trial level the trial court 
refused to hear evidence on it in the absence of an amendment to the 
pleadings. The plaintiffs neither sought to amend their pleading nor 
§12.22. 1 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 415, 297 N.E.2d 6!1. 
2 Id. at 417, 297 N.E.2d at 66. 
3 Acts of 1956, c. 665, §8, allows forty-five days for the filing of an appeal with 
the board of appeals after denial of an application for a building permit. 
4 The Boston Zoning Code, section 6.1, provides that the Board of Appeal may, 
after public notice and hearing, grant permission for certain enumerated uses which 
would normally be prohibited in a particular district. These specified uses for which 
permission may be granted are known as conditional uses. 
II Acts of 1956, c. 665. 
6 Acts of 1956, c. 665, §8. 
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took exception to the judge's ruling. Thus, since the argument was not 
part of the record below, the Appeals Court could consider the appeal 
only if the time limit was jurisdictional rather than procedural. Ordi-
narily, failure to file a timely appeal is a jurisdictional defect7 that may 
be raised at any time.8 The court, however, distinguished the tardy appeal 
of Living and Learning from the normal failure to bring a timely appeal. 
The building commissioner acted ex parte on Living and Learning's 
application and had no alternative but to deny it since the board of 
appeals is the only body empowered to allow a conditional use. In effect 
the commissioner's function is ministerial and the application denial 
merely a formal procedure.9 No issues are adjudicated by the building 
commissioner and thus the appeal to the board is an original hearing.1o 
The court ruled that the statute was designed to provide an orderly 
procedure for bringing matters before the board. For practical purposes, 
therefore, the forty-five day appeal period is meaningless since it in no 
way forecloses an applicant's right concerning a desired conditional use. 
An applicant who simply resubmits his original application to the build-
ing department will be entitled to the same appeal procedure, after the 
requisite denial, to which an original applicant is entitled who files for 
the first time. 
The plaintiffs also argued that failure to pay the required fee for the 
second appeal deprived the board of jurisdiction. The record indicated, 
however, that the building commissioner transferred the first appeals fee 
to the second appeal. Moreover, even if he had not, said the court, the 
plaintiffs would have no standing to challenge the lack of jurisdiction 
because of failure to pay the fee.11 The court went on to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence before the 
board at the time it granted defendant's application. The court affirmed 
the trial court's decision that the conditional use granted by the board 
was in complete harmony with the intent and spirit of the Boston Zoning 
Code. 
The court's decision in Lynch carries the reminder that while time 
limitations set out in zoning ordinances are usually jurisdictional, they 
are not always and in some instances must be considered procedural in 
nature. 
7 Del Grosso v. Board of Appeals of Revere, !150 Mass. 29, 110 N.E.2d 8!16 (195!1); 
Greeley v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham, !150 Mass. 549, 215 N.E.2d 791 
(1966). 
8 Golden v. Crenshaw, !102 Mass. !14!1, 19 N.E.2d 67 (19!19), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §15.12. 
8 Kolodny v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, !146 Mass. 285, 191 N.E.2d 689 (196!1); 
Kolodny v. Building Comm'r of Brookline, !146 Mass. 289, 191 N.E.2d 691 (196!1), 
noted in 196!1 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§1!1.6·1!1.7. 
10 Shopper's World v. Beacon Terrace Realty, Inc., !15!1 Mass. 6!1, 228 N.E.2d 446 
(1967), noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.5. 
11 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 417, 27!1 N.E.2d at 66. 
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§1!.23. Estoppel by judgment: Prior mandamus action. In City of 
Boston v. Pagliaro,l the city sought to enjoin construction of a high-rise 
apartment building on the grounds that it violated certain requirements 
of the Boston Zoning Code governing floor area ratios in the particular 
zoning district. A bill seeking temporary injunctive relief was denied and 
petitioner appealed. The Appeals Court denied the appeal and, in addi-
tion, awarded costs to the defendants.2 
The facts disclose that the suit in Pagliaro was preceded by a manda-
mus action brought by the defendants' predecessor in title to compel the 
issuance of a building permit. The Appeals Court ruled that the issue of 
compliance with the zoning code provisions was such a material issue in 
the prior case "that the judgment entered therein ·could not possibly 
have been entered without that issue having been adjudicated adversely 
to the party later attempting to raise it."B Thus, estoppel by judgment 
was the theory employed by the Appeals Court in finding for the defen-
dants in the city's suit for injunction. Relevant to the court's decision 
was the fact that the earlier mandamus proceeding resulted in the 
issuance of a building permit to defendants' predecessor in title. No permit 
could have been issued in that proceeding if the court, the building com-
missioner, or the zoning administrator had found any non-compliance 
with the relevant articles of the zoning code. Since there had been no 
material changes in either the zoning code or the building plan which 
necessitated a re-examination of the compliance issue, the doctrine of 
estoppel by judgment was brought into play to deny the petitioners 
relief. 
In deciding the case, the court declined to make a definitive inter-
pretation of certain controversial sections of the zoning regulations. De-
termination of this problem was not required since the earlier mandamus 
proceeding had been decided on a particular interpretation accepted at 
the hearing by all parties concerned, which found the building in com-
pliance with the floor area ratio requirements. The new, more limited 
interpretation of the floor area ratio regulations had been developed by a 
member of the mayor's staff prior to the mandamus hearing and the 
building inspector had been informed of it. However, there was no evi-
dence that the zoning administrator knew of this change in interpreta-
tion of the regulations. Moreover, the zoning administrator had testified 
in the mandamus action that the building complied with the zoning law. 
While the court noted that res judicata rather than collateral estoppel 
may have been the appropriate issue on these facts,' it decided the case 
on the equally effective estoppel by judgment doctrine. Although the 
§12.25. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 125, 294 N.E.2d 551. 
2 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at lSI, 294 N.E.2d at 555. 
a Id. at 128, 294 NE . .2d at 5M. 
4 Id. at 128 n.4, 294 N.E.2d at 554 n.4. 
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case resulted ip. approval of a building which, under subsequent inter-
pretation by the courts of the applicable zoning regulations, may prove 
to have an excessive floor area ratio, the City of Boston could not com-
plain since it had previously accepted a less restrictive interpretation of 
the regulations and had certified to the Federal Housing Administration 
that the building was in compliance with the zoning laws. Construction 
of the building was well under way when the issue of the validity of the 
building permit was first raised and construction continued in large part 
because the FHA financing stipulated that delays in construction of over 
twenty days would be at the risk of mortgage foreclosure. The city may 
have been properly unhappy but the court correctly found that the issue 
of zoning compliance had been settled between the parties in the man-
damus action and could not again be litigated in the present action to 
enjoin construction. 
§12.24. Special permit: Scope of review of denial. In Vazza Proper-
ties Inc. v. City Council of Wobum,l the Appeals Court dealt with the 
issue of the scope of review available when a special permit has been 
denied .. The plaintiff in this case had filed an application for a special 
permit to build a 144-unit apartment complex in a residential zone. 
The city council, acting as a board of appeals, denied the application 
after a public hearing. The council gave the following reasons for denial: 
first, the proposed construction would aggravate a periodic flooding 
problem; second, the municipal water supply was insufficient for such a 
large-scale development; and third, the increased traffic would create a 
safety problem. The applicants appealed to the superior court under 
G.L. c. 40A, §21. After a de novo review of the evidence, the trial judge 
reached substantially the same factual conclusions and ruled that the 
city council had not abused their administrative discretion.2 It is from 
this decree denying the application that the plaintiff appealed. 
The plaintiff argued that the trial court's findings of fact were not 
sufficiently detailed to comply with the standam of review required by 
G.L. c. 40A, §2l,a as first construed in Prendergllt v. Board of Appeals of 
Barnstable' and more recently in Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brook-
line. IS The court distinguished the Josephs case in that it was an appeal 
from the grant of several special permits, as well as a variance, whereas 
the present case involved the denial of a special permit. In reviewing 
the grant of a special permit a trial court must independently make an 
§12.24. 1 197lJ Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. lJ55, 296 N.E.2d 220. 
2 See 197lJ Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. lJ55, lJ56 n.lJ, 296 N.E.2d 220, 221 n.lJ. 
a G.L. c. 40A, §21 provides for a de novo review by the superior court to deter-
mine if the board exceeded its authority, or if not, if the board reached the correct 
result based on all the evidence. 
4 lJlJ1 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954). 
IS 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1405, 285 N.E.2d 4lJ6, noted in 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§22.11-22.12. 
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affirmative finding that each condition of the. ordinance or by-law is met 
before affirming the board's decision.6 In reviewing the denial of a special 
permit, however, a court need only ascertain if the reasons for denial 
have substantial basis in fact. 7 1£ the formal notice and public hearing 
requirements have been met, the council's (or board's) discretionary 
decision cannot be reversed "unless [it is] based on legally untenable 
ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary."8 Under 
this standard the judge's independent findings in the instant case were 
sufficient to uphold his conclusion that the city council did not act 
arbitrarily in denying the special permit. The opinion in Vazza is a clear 
expression of the different standards imposed upon the judge depending 
on whether he is reviewing the grant of a special permit or the denial 
of such a permit. 
§12.25. Definition of use: Mobile home. The 1973 Survey year saw 
the Supreme Judicial Court attack the problem of defining the term 
"mobile home" as it was used in a local zoning by-law.1 In Board of 
Selectmen of Hatfield v. Garvey,2 the Court carefully limited its decision 
to the by-law in question and abstained from generalities that would be 
binding on other communities. 
Since 1961 the defendants had operated a combined package store, 
tavern, and laundromat in a wooden building located on the land in 
question. In 1970 a fire completely destroyed this structure. Garvey ap-
plied for and was granted a permit to construct a one-story building of 
wood, aluminum, and steel to be set on a concrete block foundation. 
Garvey then ordered, from a manufacturer of mobile homes, a unit with 
an office, sales room, and storage ar6a, and without sanitary facilities. 
The unit was delivered to the site on wheels that were subsequently 
removed when the unit was placed on the concrete block foundation. 
Since the defendants' land is located in a Residence A district in which 
moqile homes are prohibited by the local by-laws, the Board of Selectmen 
sought injunctive relief..Jo force the defendant to remove the new struc-
ture. The trial court dlr'inissed the board's bill in equity, upon modifica-
tion of the master's report, and the board appealed. The Supreme Judicial 
Court restricted its decision to the determination of the issue of whether 
or not the particular structure involved was a mobile home. 1£ the struc-
6 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 357, 296 N.E.2d at 222. 
7 ld. 
8 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277, 244 N.E.2d 
!Ill, 313 (1969), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5; MacGibbon v. Board of 
Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639, 255 N.E.2d 347, !150 (1969), noted in 1970 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.2. 
§12.25. 1 A Town of Hatfield zoning by-law dealing with Business B districts 
was involved. 
2 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 103, 291 N.E.2d 593. 
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ture was a mobile home as contemplated by the local by-law, then there 
was no question that it was prohibited at its present location. 
The court found that the building was neither designed nor built for 
residential purposes and hence could not be a "mobile home" as defined 
by the ordinance.8 The new structure differed in many respects from the 
customary five-room mobile home. There were no sanitary facilities and 
no windows in the rear, and the unit had reinforced floors, additional 
insulation, wooden doors, and a walk-in refrigerator. These vital struc-
tural differences served to distinguish the defendants' building from the 
normal commercially-built mobile home. The court also rejected the 
board's argument that specific provisions to permit "mobile homes" in 
Business B districts illustrated the town's recognition of the commercial 
uses of such units. The court viewed this provision as merely the means 
used to exclude mobile homes from residential districts, since otherwise 
the term "mobile unit" would have been utilized by the draftsmen.• 
The court also reviewed the issue of "mobility," an issue that had 
arisen in Manchester v. Phillips/• which the plaintiffs argued was con-
trolling in the instant case. The court had ruled in Manchester that a 
mobile home retained that classification despite the fact that it was 
permanently affixed to a foundation. 6 The court found the present 
controversy distinguishable since the structure in question was never a 
mobile home but rather a modular unit constructed specifically for com-
mercial purposes.T · 
The court concluded its opinion with the caveat that its statements 
in this case and in the Manchester case were not all-inclusive definitions 
of the term "mobile home."8 As it pointed out, various statutory contexts 
could alter the court's interpretation of the term, as could changing 
social problems.o 
§12.26. Nonconforming use: Not personal to original owner. In City 
of Revere v. Rowe Contracting Co.l the city sought to enjoin the use 
8 Id. at 108, 291 N.E.2d at 597. 
4 Id. 
li M3 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 33!1 (1962), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.7. 
6 Id. at 595·96, 180 N.E.2d at 336. 
1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 108, 291 N.E.2d at 597. 
8 Id. at 109, 291 N.E.2d at 597. 
9 The oourt in this case did, in fact, reject the argument of the defendants that 
the term "mobile home" must be interpreted in acoordance with the definition in 
G.L c. 140, §32L It held that this statute was a licensing statute and that definitions 
therein were in no sense oonttolling in the interpretation of local zoning regulations. 
197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 107, 291 N.E.2d at 596. A state statute oould not be oonttolling 
unless specifically stated to be so, in which case it would supersede any local inter-
pretation. Thus, for example, while a variance is a variance no matter what a local 
zoning regulation might call it, definitions of "use" terms will generally be held to 
be matters of local interpretation. 
§12.26. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1804, 289 N.E.2d 830. 
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of residential-zoned land for storage of rock salt for the treatment of 
ice and snow conditions on highways. The Supreme Judicial Court 
found that as to that part of the land purchased by the defendant in 
1939, the use was a protected nonconforming use, but as to the land 
purchased in 1949, the use was not so protected.2 This distinction was 
drawn due to the fact that the applicable Revere zoning ordinance was 
adopted in 1929 but, because of failure to meet certain publication re-
quirements, was of questionable validity until 1945.8 The Supreme 
· Judicial Court held that the lower court had properly followed the test 
set out in Bridgewater v. Chuckran4 for determining if a nonconforming 
use existed and upheld the decision below.11 
The city raised the issue that the Commonwealth had been the owner 
that had used the land originally for storage of salt thereon. The court 
noted, in accordance with the current standard, that a nonconforming 
use is not personal to a particular owner but runs with the land itsel£.8 
Thus the fact that the use was originally owned by the Commonwealth 
as a prior owner did not prevent the present private owner from retain-
ing the benefit. 
§ 12.27. Nonconforming use: Right to rebuild after destruction. In 
Berliner v. Feldman,! the Supreme Judicial Court considered the difficult 
question of the extent of rebuilding permitted under a local zoning by-
law governing nonconforming uses. Until 1963, the Turk's Head Inn of 
Rockport was operated for approximately seventy-five years as a summer 
resort hotel. In 1951, when the town enacted its zoning ordinances, the 
premises were placed in a single residence district, thus becoming a 
protected nonconforming use. Originally the inn was a three section 
2 Id. at 1805, 289 N.E.2d at 881. 
8 Apparently the R.evere zoning by-law had faileci to meet the publication require-
ments of G.L c. 40, §2. This lack of validity was remedied by Acts of 1945, c. 107 
which specifically approved the Revere zoning by-law as of that date. 
The original 1929 ordinance prohibited non-residential uses of the land. The court 
used the 1945 date to distinguish between the two parcels, one purchased in 1989, 
the other in 1949. Thus, the court considered any use prior to 1945 to be a protected 
non-conforming use at the time of the by-law's effective date, whereas uses after 1945 
were required to conform to the local by-law. 
4 851 Mass. 20, 217 N.E.2d 726 (1966). The Chuckran test for determining whether 
the current use of property fits within the exemption for non-conforming uses is 
threefold: 
(1) whether the use reflects the nature and purpose of the use prevailing when 
the zoning by-law took effect, (2) whether there is a difference in the quality or 
character, as well as degree, of use, and (8) whether the current use is different 
in kind in its effect on the neighborhood. 
Id. at 28, 217 N.E.2d at 727-28. 
II 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1805, 289 N.E.2d at 881. 
8 ld. at 1805, 289 N.E.2d at 880. See also G.L. c. 40A, §5 and its predecessors. 
§12.27. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 955, 298 N.E.2d 155. 
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wooden structure, but in 1968 fire damaged the center section, and in 
1969 the center section, south wing, and connecting arms were razed. 
In 1969 a second fire damaged the remaining north wing, and finally, 
in 1970, the remainder of the hotel was destroyed by fire. Thirty-four 
residents and taxpayers of Rockport sought a declaration of the hotel 
owner's rights under the existing zoning by-laws which provide that a 
nonconforming use may be "rebuilt if damaged or destroyed."2 The 
plaintiffs specifically challenged the validity of the by-law and further 
claimed that the 1969 razing of the center section, south wing, and con-
necting arms constituted a voluntary abandonment of the nonconform-
ing use, at least as to those particular sections. The court was also 
requested, if any rebuilding were permitted, to decide whether the inn 
could be operated only on a seasonal basis or whether it could be 
operated year round. The trial judge ruled that the by-law was author-
ized under the Zoning Enabling Act and that the provisions of the 
by-law were not so vague as to render them invalid.8 The plaintiffs 
appealed from this finding. 1 The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial court's ruling that there is no statutory prohibition against a zoning by-law which permits the 
rebuilding of a valid nonconforming use which· has been destroyed.' 
While Section 5 of G.L. c. 40A, sets certain minimum protections for 
nonconforming uses, it does not prohibit municipalities from giving ex-
tensive rights to rebuild, reconstruct or alter such uses. In addressing 
itself to the plaintiffs' contention that the by-law provided insufficient 
standards to guide the discretionary actions of the local board of ap-
peals,ll the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the language .of the Rock-
port by-law grants an absolute right to the owner of a nonconforming use 
and does not therefore involve the exercise of discretion by the board.8 
2 Section 8.1 of the Rockport zoning by-laws. 
a The ·mal rourt ·did not decide the issue of whether or not there had been a 
voluntary abandonment of the nonronforming use nor did it rule on the question 
of whether the inn rould be operated all year round. 
' 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 957-58, 298 N.E.2d at 156. In Chilson v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeal of Attleboro, M4 Mass. 406, 182 N.E.2d 535 (1962), the rourt upheld a zoning 
ordinance which allowed the "alteration, enlargement, reronstruction, moving, or 
replacement of, or addition to a nonronforming building'' as applied to the modern-
ization of a service station. See Comment, 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass Law §13.4. 
II If such imprecision existed, the by-law would be clearly invalid. McAleer v. 
Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 469, 2il) N.E.2d 166, noted in 
1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.10. See also Smith v. Board of Appeals of Fall River, 
319 Mass. Ml, 65 N.E.2d 547 (1946). 
8 Section 8.1 of the Rockport zoning by-law provides in relevant part that "any 
lawful ••• building, structure, or premises existing at the time this bylaw is adopted, 
even if not in ronformity with its provisions, may be rontinued [and may be] rebuilt 
if damaged or destroyed . . • and, if authorized by the Board of Appeals, may be 
enlarged." 
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Hence, the standards sought by the plaintiffs were unnecessary in this 
type of by-law.7 
The court next faced the issue of the voluntariness of the 1969 demo-
lition of the center section and connecting arms. The plaintiffs argued 
that the demolition was based on economic rather than on safety con-
siderations. Unable to find sufficient evidence in the record to rule on 
this point, the court remanded the case to the trial court for further 
hearings on the voluntariness of the demolition. In doing so, the court 
suggested that demolition for economic or possible planning reasons 
could be construed as a forfeiture of the absolute right to rebuild and 
as an abandonment of the nonconforming use, while no such dire con-
sequences would attach to a decision based on public safety considera-
tions.s 
The court also gave a declaration of the rights of the owner of the inn 
in regard to the nature of permissible reconstruction of the inn. The 
plaintiffs argued that if rebuilding were permitted any new structure 
must conform to the original 1888 use, and they urged the court to place 
restrictions on the rebuilding to prohibit the installation of central 
heating, private baths, and convenient corridors. The owner urged that 
the only restrictions should be that the new building be used as an inn 
and that the external dimensions coincide with the original building. 
The court found support for the owner's argument in previous cases 
in which it had been held that modernization of a nonconforming struc-
ture9 and interior alterationslo do not constitute a change in the original 
nonconforming use. Therefore, the owner was entitled to build a mod-
ern hotel.11 The by-law grants an absolute right to rebuild a damaged or 
destroyed nonconforming use and in that respect goes beyond the mini-
mum tolerance of nonconforming uses required by G.L. c. 40A, §5. This 
unusually permissive standard was noted by the court and was applied 
by it to the question of year-round use of the rebuilt structure. The 
court, relying on Rockport's liberal attitude toward nonconforming uses, 
ruled that the business of the new building may, as of right, be carried 
on throughout the year, and may not be limited to seasonal use only.12 
T 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 959, 298 N.E.2d at 157. 
8 Id. 
9 Morin v. Board of Appeals of Leominster, !J52 Mass. 620, 227 N.E.2d 466 (1966), 
noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.2. 
10 Paul v. Selectmen of Scituate, 301 Mass. 365, 17 N.E.2d 193 (1938). 
11 Feldman cannot build a motel as he originally desired since the Rockport 
zoning by-law distinguishes between a motel and a hotel. See 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 955 n.1, 298 N.E.2d at 155 n.l. 
12 Id. at 963, 298 N.E.2d at 159. In McAleer v. Board of Appeals at Barnstable, 
1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 496, 280 N.E.2d 166, the court indicated that absent any explicit 
guidance in the local by·law as to the expansion or enlargement of a non-conforming 
summer use, the issue would be decided by the "spirit" expressed in the by-law 
towards nonconforming uses. 
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The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on 
the issue of the voluntariness of the 1969 demolition. Upon resolution of 
this issue the trial court was instructed to render a final decree consistent 
with the opinion of the court. 
This case is somewhat special because of the thrust of the Rockport 
by-law which the court properly categorized as "permissive."18 Most local 
regulations tend to restrict nonconforming uses by limiting any rebuild-
ing, remodelling or extensive alteration. Nonconforming uses in a given 
zone may, depending upon the nature of the permitted uses and the 
area involved, be either basically compatible or basically incompatible 
with the permitted uses. It may be appropriate to legislate in such a way 
that those uses that are not offensive or basically undesirable be per-
mitted to remain and those that are troublesome or out-of-place be 
severely restricted. Apart from some equal protection problems, the atti-
tude on which the Rockport by-law is based represents rather an abdica-
tion of the planning process. If a hotel is not incompatible with the zone 
in which it is located, would it not be preferable for the special permit 
provisions to govern its use, extension and rebuilding, than that there 
exist a blanket "permissive attitude" type of nonconforming use regula-
tion? The Rockport by-law, it is submitted, represents poor planning and 
a failure to meet the issues of mixed but possibly compatible uses head-on. 
§12.28. Nonconforming use: Use, quality of use and diJierence in 
kind. In Powers v. Building Inspector of Barnstable,! the Supreme Judi-
cial Court was again confronted with a nonconforming use problem. 
The plaintiffs, adjoining landowners, petitioned for a writ of mandamus 
to compel the local building inspector to enforce the local zoning by-law. 
The town's first zoning by-law, adopted in 1949, classified the two parcels 
in question {Parcel 1 and Parcel 2) as Residence A. A subsequent re-
vision of the by-law in 1956 reclassified the parcels to a Residence C 
district. Both by-laws included saving clauses for nonconforming build-
ings and uses.2 The two parcels are occupied by several buildings in 
which Old Harbor Candle Co., an intervenor in this case, operates a 
business for the manufacture of candles, and the wholesale and retail sale 
of candles and other gift items. The plaintiffs alleged that the current 
use has changed in such a degree since the original adoption of the 
zoning by-law in 1949 (and revision in 1956) that it is no longer a 
privileged nonconforming use. The owners and lessee, both intervenors, 
denied any substantial "change" of use which would subject the parcel 
to the requirements of the zoning by-law. Basing its decision on the 
differences in the use of the two parcels, the superior court denied the 
18 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 964, 298 N.E.2d at 160. 
§12.28. 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 821, 296 N.E.2d 491. 
2 See G.L. c. 40A, §5. 
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relief sought as to one parcel but granted it as to the other. The ad-
joining landowners, the candle company and the realty trust all ap-
pealed.8 
The Supreme Judicial Court outlined the three tests for "determining 
whether current use of property fits within the exemption granted to 
non-conforming uses."4 These tests are: 
(1) Whether the use reflects the "nature and purpose" of the use 
prevailing when the zoning by-law took effect; (2) Whether there is 
a difference in the quality of character, as well as degree of use; and 
(3) Whether the current use is "different in kind in its effect on the 
neighborhood."ll 
The court noted that the development and application of the law gov-
erning nonconforming uses has been on a case-by-case basis and it gave 
a synopsis of the most frequently cited cases that have either upheld, 
rejected or limited claims of valid nonconforming uses.8 
The building in Powers which was used for the manufacture and sale 
of candles and other merchandise was located on Parcel 1. It had been 
used continuously since 1946 for the same business purposes although 
the management had changed several times. The court found that the 
trial judge correctly ruled that the present use 
represents a continuation of the use prevailing at the time of the 
adoption of the ... [zoning] by-law; that ... such use was lawful 
at the time of adoption; [and] that there is a difference in degree of 
such use, but not in the quality or character thereof. 7 
On the other hand, Parcel 2 was improved by two buildings, the 
"Schoolhouse" and the "Warehouse." The Schoolhouse is a two-story 
wooden structure. The first floor was utilized as storage during the 1950's 
while the second floor was occupied as living quarters at least until 1959. 
The first floor is still used for miscellaneous storage while the second 
floor has been converted into the administrative offices of the candle 
company. The court held that the present use of the first floor of the 
Schoolhouse as a storage area is a lawful continuation of a nonconform-
ing use, but that the use of the second floor as administrative offices is 
unlawful since it is not a protected nonconforming use.s 
a The owners of the two parcels were the trustees of ·the realty trust and the lessee 
was the candle rompany. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 825, 296 N.E.2d at 495, quoting Bridgewater v. Chucltran, 
551 Mass. 20, 25, 217 N.E.2d 726, 727 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§15.18. 
II 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 825, 296 N.E.2d at 495. 
8 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 826, 296 N.E.2d at 495. 
T Id. at 850, 296 N.E.2d at 499. 
8 Id. The serond floor of the Schoolhouse was previously used as living quarters: 
hence it was only protected for that use. 
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The Warehouse is a large, corrugated metal building, erected in 1912, 
that had been used for a variety of storage purposes until 1962 when it 
was sold to the present owner. The building is currently used as a ship-
ping depot for the candle company, an operation that involves three or 
four trucks per day visiting the premises. Using the test outlined above-
which was first developed by the court in Bridgewater v. Chuckran-
the court in Powers held that the present use of the warehouse is not 
entitled to protection as a valid nonconforming use.9 The Warehouse, 
at the time of the 1956 amendment, was used as "dead" storage which 
involved very little activity. The Warehouse is now an essential element 
of the candle company's wholesale trade that accounts for about ninety 
percent of its total revenues. This increase in activity-especially the 
trucking activity to and from the Warehouse-was a determining factor 
in the court's ruling that the present use of the Warehouse was not pro-
tected under the Chuckran test. 
Hence, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial court in denying 
a writ of mandamus as to Parcel I, on which the manufacture and sale 
operations are housed; upheld the trial court in issuing a writ to compel 
the building inspector to enforce the zoning by-law as to the Warehouse; 
and modified the degree as to the Schoolhouse by refusing to issue a writ 
as to the first floor storage area, but issuing one as to the second floor 
administrative offices. 
As is often the situation in nonconforming use cases, the questions in 
this case were largely factual. The court's review of the more prominent 
earlier nonconforming uses is valuable as a guide to its thinking on the 
tests it developed earlier in Chuckran. It has occurred to this writer 
often that legislative reworking of the entire area of nonconforming uses 
should be given substantial priority over other legislative undertakings. 
Local governing bodies should be permitted, by amendment of the 
Zoning Enabling Act, to develop amortization procedures when con-
sidered appropriate.1o Local planning, and thus local zoning regulation 
should recognize that some types of mixed uses are compatible with 
other differing uses that are the main uses permitted in a given zone, 
while others are clearly noncompatible. All constitutionally permitted 
machinery should be made available to localities seeking to terminate 
these latter uses. In addition, a landowner seeking to establish the nature 
and quality of a nonconforming use should have a less expensive and 
more informal procedure made available to him so that this can be done 
when evidence is available and not later when the information is in-
9 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 852, 296 N.E.2d at 500. 
10 G.L. c. 40A, §5 does not, by its terms, permit the termination of nonronforming 
uses over a period of time by amortization. This procedure, however, has been 
implemented in other states. See C. Haar, Land Use Planning 267-68 (1959). See . 
also Stoner McCrory Sys. v. Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1515, 78 N.W.2d 845 (1956); City 
of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d M (1954). 
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complete and inexact. These suggestions, if implemented, would at least 
make this area of zoning law less of a morass of expensive litigation. 
§ 12.29. Earth removal: Conditions imposed upon grant of permit. 
The Appeals Court, in Kelleher v. Board of Selectmen of Pembroke,1 
enumerated several issues which it held to be beyond the legitimate con-
cern of a board of selectmen when ruling on an application for a permit 
under a local earth removal by-law. In 1970, the plaintiff's predecessor 
in title, one Walsh, acquired a large tract of land primarily situated in 
Pembroke. The tract was bisected by a dead-end dirt public road. During 
April of 1971 the plaintiff, Kelleher, began extensive earth removal 
operations and in May of that year purchased the entire parcel from 
Walsh. None of the plaintiff's activities were prohibited by any existing 
zoning by-law; however, aerial photographs revealed that the large tract 
was becoming a barren wasteland, and that a small brook was threatened 
with extinction. The earth removal was accompanied by the frequent 
movement of heavy equipment and trucks on the streets surrounding the 
tract. This heavy traffic of approximately one truck per minute con-
tinued throughout the daylight hours during the period from April 
to October 1971. 
At a special town meeting in September of 1971, the town adopted a 
comprehensive earth removal by-law2 which prohibited all earth removal 
unless done in compliance with a permit granted by the board of 
selectmen. The by-law provided for an extensive, detailed application 
for any new or existing earth removal and also provided for a hearing 
on each application. The by-law allowed the board to condition the 
grants of any permits for the continuance of existing earth removal with 
provisions to restore areas of past removal. 
After the effective date of the by-law the selectmen, by having the 
police stop the plaintiff's trucks, caused the plaintiff's operation to 
cease. Walsh, acting for the plaintiff, applied for a permit, submitting 
site plans which were originally drawn in March of 1970 but which 
were no longer accurate because of the large alterations caused by 
seven months of earth removal. In addition to the present inaccuracy 
of the submitted plans the application was incomplete in other details 
required by the by-law. The selectmen denied this application after the 
§12.29. 1 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 187, 294 N.E.2d 512. 
2 The by-law provides, in relevant part: 
All removal of soil, loam, sand, gravel or rock from land • • . is hereby pro-
hibited unless done in strict compliance with a permit granted hereunder by 
the [b]oard of [s]electmen. Removal shall mean stripping, digging, or excavating 
the foregoing earth material from one lot and removing or carrying it away 
from said lot. 
Article 12B A of the Pembroke earth removal by-laws. See also articles 12B D 15 and 
12B E. The Pembroke by-llws are summarized by the court in 1978 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. at 191-92, 244 N.E.2d at 516-17. 
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required public hearing and issued a written decision which specifically 
stated that the denial was without prejudice. 
The plaintiff in the present case then sought injunctive relief to pro-
hibit further interference with his earth removal operation as it was 
conducted immediately prior to the .effective date of the zoning by-law. 
The Appeals Court held that, absent any showing of intentional mis-
application of law by the board, there were grounds which justified 
the board's action. The court found that the board's concern over the 
plight of the public road intersecting plaintiff's property, the public 
nuisance created by plaintiff's trucks, and the lack of available loam to 
cover proposed excavation were legitimate grounds for the denial of 
plaintiff's application.8 There was thus no basis for reversal of its 
decision and an injunction would not issue. The court also held that 
the retroactive application of the earth removal by-law to an existing 
operation was constitutional.' 
Although the court found sufficient grounds for the board's denial of 
the plaintiff's application, it also noted several matters which the board 
had improperly considered during its review of the plaintiff's application 
for a permit. The court found that it was improper for the board to 
base its denial of the permit on the "likelihood that truck traffic would 
create or continue a hazard" on a street adjacent to the excavation site.11 
Additionally the board should not have considered the destruction of 
that portion of the plaintiff's property zoned for residential purposes, 
since this was a matter for the owner's discretion. The plaintiff had the 
right to choose to sacrifice the value of the smaller portion of the tract 
in order to reap the great benefit of a single use of the entire area.6 
The board also erroneously considered sanitary and disposal conditions, 
and grading of the land in connection with future industrial uses of 
the property. These were premature matters said the court, which should 
have been left for future decision by the appropriate agencies, which, 
under the Subdivision Control Law, are the planning board and the 
health board. 7 
8 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 194-95, 294 N.E.2d at 518-19. 
4 Id. at 200-0l, 294 N.E.2d at 520. 
II Id. at 195-96, 294 N.E.2d at 519. See also Stow v. Marinelli, 352 Mass. 738, 227 
N.E.2d 708 (1967), noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §21.3; Goodwin v. Selectmen 
of Hopkinton, 358 Mass. 164, 261 N.E.2d 60 (1970); Glacier Sand and Stone Co. v. 
Board of Appeals of Westwood, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1319, 285 N.E.2d 411 (1972). 
6 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 196, 294 N.E.2d at 519. 
7 Id. These were considered premature matters since the only issue before the 
board was whether or not the plaintiff would excavate the land. If, at some future 
date, the plaintiff sought a building permit to construct an industrial building, the 
local agencies would have had ample opportunity to examine the suitability of the 
land for the desired use. See also Daley Constr. Co. v. Planning Board of Randolph, 
340 Mass. 149, 163 N.E.2d 27 (1959); Caruso v. Planning Board of Revere, 354 Mass. 
569, 238 N.E.2d 872 (1968), noted in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.9; G.L. c. 41, 
§81M, as amended by Acts of 1969, c. 884, §2. 
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The court also rejected as improper the board's attempt to impose 
conditions as to reseeding and grading of those areas that had been 
excavated by the plaintiff prior to the effective date of the earth removal 
by-law. This would have been an impermissible retroactive penalty for 
actions lawful at the time they were taken.s The inclusion of this type 
of provision in the local by-law was therefore improper. 
Despite these misapplications of the law, there were no fatal errors 
in the board's actions requiring reversal absent a showing of "unreason-
able, arbitrary, whimsical or capricious" behavior by the board.9 The 
court quickly dismissed the petitioner's contention of unconstitutional 
application of the by-law by referring to the numerous cases decided 
under the Zoning Enabling Act1o which permit a zoning by~law to im-
pose reasonable regulations on the conduct and expansion of existing 
earth removal operations. The court then concluded that since a town 
may act under either the Zoning Enabling Act or the Earth Removal 
Enabling Act11 in drafting regulations to control earth removal, the 
constitutional principles that apply to zoning by-laws should also apply 
to earth removal by-laws,12 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§12.30. "Anti-Snob Zoning Law": Power of the Housing AppeaJa 
Committee and zoning boards of appeaJa to override local zoning 
restrictions in granting comprehensive permits for construction of low 
and moderate income housing: Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing 
Appeals Committee in the Dep't of Community AffiJWs.1 In April 1970, 
Country Village Corporation [the Hanover applicant] filed an applica-
tion with the Hanover Board of Appeals [the Hanover Board], in accor-
dance with chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969 [the "Anti-Snob Zoning 
Law"]2 for a comprehensive permit to build eighty-eight units of low and 
s Butler v. East Bridgewater, !lliO Mass. !Ill, !19-40, 110 N.E.2d 922, 926 (195!1). This 
section of the opinion served to invalidate Art. 12B D 15 of the earth removal by-law 
on oonstitutional grounds. 
9 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 197, 294 N.E.2d at 520. 
10 G.L. c. 40~ See Burlington v. Dunn, !118 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 24!1 (1945), cert. 
den. sub. nom. Dunn v. Town of Burlington, !126 U.S. 7!19 (1946), and other cases 
cited in 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 187, 197, 294 N.E.2d 512, 520. 
11 G.L. c. 40, §20(17). 
12 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 198, 294 N.E.2d at 520. 
§12.!10. 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 491, 294 N.E.2d !19!1. The statement of facts contained 
herein is taken from 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 491-9!1, 294 N.E.2d at 400-01. This case 
is also oommented upon in §12.10 supra. 
2 Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969, now oontained in G.L c. 40B, 1§20·2!1 and G.L c. 
2!1B, §5A, was designed to promote the construction of low and moderate inoome 
housing. G.L. c. 40B §21 provides in part: 
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moderate income housing for the elderly. After a public hearing, the 
Hanover Board denied the application for the permit, citing, inter alia, 
the failure of the applicant to submit adequate drainage and sewerage 
plans, traffic problems that would be generated by the proposed project, 
and the "apparent conflict between chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969 and 
the zoning bylaws of the town of Hanover in regard to zoning districts 
and permissible uses in different zoning districts."8 The Hanover appli-
cant subsequently appealed to the Housing Appeals Committee pursuant 
to section 22 of chapter 40B.' 
In January 1971, the Concord Home Owning Corporation [the Con-
cord applicant] filed with the Board of Appeals of Concord [the Concord 
Board] an application for a comprehensive permit to construct sixty 
garden apartment units of low and moderate income housing. The 
Concord Board denied the permit, stating that the construction of the 
project would be in violation of Concord's zoning by-law and that, at 
any rate,· the severe subsurface water conditions affecting the area in 
which the housing was proposed to be built rendered the denial of the 
application "reasonable and consistent with local needs" in that the 
project "could be detrimental to the health and safety of the future 
occupants of the project and the residents of the Town in the vicinity 
Any public agency or limited dividend or nonprofit organization proposing to 
build low or moderate income housing may submit to the board of appeals ... 
a single application to build such housing in lieu of separate applications to the 
applicable local boards. The board of appeals shall forthwith notify each such 
local board, as applicable, of the filing of such application by sending a copy 
thereof to such local boards for their recommendations and shall, within thirty days 
of the receipt of such application, hold a public hearing on the same ...• The 
board of appeals shall render a decision based upon the majority vote of said 
board, within forty days after the termination of the public hearing and, if 
favorable to the applicant, shall forthwith issue a comprehensive permit or ap-
proval. If said hearing is not convened or a decision is not rendered within the 
time allowed, unless the time has been extended by mutual agreement between 
the board and the applicant, the application shall be deemed to have been 
allowed and the comprehensive permit shall forthwith issue. 
a 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 492 n.l, 294 N.E.2d at 400 n.l. 
4 G.L. c. 40B, §22 provides in part: 
Whenever an application filed under the provisions of section twenty-one is 
denied, ••• the applicant shall have the right to appeal to the housing appeals 
committee in the department of community affairs for a review of the same .... 
The committee shall forthwith notify the board of appeals of the filing of such 
petition for review and the latter shall, within ten days of the receipt of such 
notice, transmit a copy of its decision and the reasons therefor to the committee. 
Such appeal shall be heard by the committee within twenty days after receipt 
of the applicant's statement. A stenographic record of the proceedings shall be 
kept and the committee shall render a written decision, based upon a majority 
vote, stating its findings of fact, its conclusions and the reasons therefor within 
thirty days after the termination of the hearing. 
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of the project."ll The Concord applicant then exercised its right of appeal 
to the Housing Appeals Committee under section 22 of chapter 40B.6 
After holding hearings as required by section 22,7 the Housing Appeals 
Committee in each case vacated the decision of the board of appeals and 
ordered issuance of a comprehensive permit for the project, subject to 
specified conditions, notwithstanding the fact that the relevant zoning 
regulations in each town prohibited construction of the housing for 
which approval was sought. Both the Hanover Board and the Concord 
Board then filed bills in superior court for review of the committee's 
decisions.s The superior court judge reserved judgment in the cases and 
reported them without decision to the Supreme Judicial Court, where 
the cases were argued and decided together. 
The Supreme Judicial Court saw three basic issues presented for 
decision: (1) does Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969 [the Massachusetts 
"Anti-Snob Zoning Law"]o confer power upon both the Housing Appeals 
Committee and the local boards of appeals to override zoning regulations 
which hamper the construction of low and moderate income housing? 
(2) is such power to override local zoning regulations, if it exists, con-
stitutional? (3) was such a power to override local zoning regulations, 
if it exists, properly exercised by the Housing Appeals Committee in 
the instant cases?10 In a lengthy opinion the court HELD: (1) that 
chapter 774 does confer upon both the committee and boards of appeals 
the power to override local "requirements and regulations," including 
5 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 493 n.3, 294 N.E.2d at 401 n.3. G.L. c. 40B, §23 describes 
the issues to be reviewed and the standard to be applied by the HQusing Appeals 
Committee in any appeal taken under G.L. c. 40B, §22, quoted in note 4 supra, by 
an applicant for a comprehensive permit under G.L c. 40B, §21. Section 23 states in 
part: 
The hearing by the housing appeals committee in the department of community 
affairs shall be limited to the issue of whether, in the case of the denial of an 
application, the decision of the board of appeals was reasonable and consistent 
with local needs •••• If the committee finds, in the case of a denial, that the-
decision of the board of appeals was unreasonable and not consistent with local 
needs, it shall vacate such decision and shall direct the board to issue a com-
prehensive permit or approval to the applicant. 
G.L c. 40B, §23. The statutory test of whether a "requirement or regulation" is 
"consistent with local needs," set out in G.L. c. 40B, §20, requires a balancing of 
"the regional need for low and moderate income housing" with, among other factors, 
"the need to protect the health or safety of the occupants of the proposed housing or 
of the residents of the city or town." See G.L c. 40B, §20, quoted in text at note 34 
infra. 
6 See G.L. c. 40B, §22, quoted in note 4 supra. 
7 Id. 
8 G.L c. 40B, §22 provides, inter alia, that decisions of the Housing Appeals 
Committee rendered under that section may be reviewed in the superior court in 
accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. 30A. 
9 G.L c. 40B, §§20-23 and G.L. c. 23B, §5A. 
10 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 493-94, 294 N.E.2d at 401. 
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zoning ordinances or by-laws, which are not "consistent with local needs," 
as defined by the act;n (2) that this power to override local zoning regu-
lations neither violates the 1966 "Home Rule Amendment"12 nor con-
stitutes "spot zoning"18 and is therefore constitutional; and (3) that there 
was substantial evidence to support the Housing Appeals Committee's 
decisions that the denials by the Hanover and Concord boards of the 
applications for comprehensive permits were unreasonable and not con-
sistent with local needs.14 
This article will first outline briefly the problem of exclusionary zoning 
which chapter 774 was designed to confront in the area of subsidized 
housing. It will then analyze both the legislative history and the express 
language of chapter 774 in concluding that the Supreme Judicial Court 
was correct from both legal and policy perspectives in holding that the 
Housing Appeals Committee and local boards of appeals have the power 
under the Act to override local zoning restrictions which are not "con-
sistent with local needs," as defined in the statute. Finally, it will be 
11 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 504, 294 N.E.2d at 407. For the Act's definition of "con-
sistent with local needs," see G.L. c. 40B, §20, quoted in text at note 34 infra. 
12 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 508-09, 294 N.E.2d at 410. Mass. Const. amend. art. 
LXXXIX is the "Home Rule Amendment." 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 511, 294 N.E.2d at 411. "Spot zoning" is the practice 
whereby a single lot or area:. (a) is granted privileges which are not extended to other 
land in the same use district; or (b) has burdens imposed upon it which are more 
rigid than those imposed on other properties within the same district. 1 A. Rathkopf, 
The Law of Zoning and Planning 26-1 (3d ed. 1972). The practice has also been 
described as "a singling out of one lot for different treatment from that accorded to 
similar surrounding land indistinguishable from it in character, all for the economic 
benefit of the owner of that lot." Lamarre v. Comm'r of Pub. Works, 324 Mass. 542, 
545, 87 N.E.2d 211, 2U (1949). In holding that the exercise of the power, under 
chapter 774, to override local zoning ordinances deemed inconsistent with local needs 
does not constitute spot zoning, the Hanover court emphasized that the "special 
treatment" accorded by chapter 774 to sites for low and moderate income housing 
serves the general welfare rather than merely affording an economic benefit to the 
owner of the land receiving special treatment. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 511, 294 N.E.2d 
at 41 I. 
14 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 530, 294 N.E.2d at 422. 
The court also held: (1) that chapter 774 was not unconstitutionally vague for not 
supplying sufficient standards for use by the boards of appeals in passing on applica-
tions for comprehensive permits (the court concluding that the standards to be applied 
by the boards of appeals are the same as those to be applied by the Housing Appeals 
Committee in reviewing the boards' decisions, namely, whether a denial of a permit 
would be "reasonable and consistent with local needs" and whether any conditions 
imposed upon the granting of a. permit would make the building or operation of the 
housing "uneconomic"), 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 512-13, 294 N.E.2d at 412. See G.L. c. 
40B, §23 and text at notes 30-32 infra; (2) that chapter 774 requires that the review 
by the Housing Appeals Committee be in the form of a de novo hearing, 1973 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 517, 294 N.E.2d at 415; and (3) that the Housing Appeals Committee 
has the power to order the issuance of permits or approvals subject to "sufficiently 
definite" conditions or requirements. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 521-23, 294 N.E.2d. at 
417-18. 
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submitted that although the court's decision will likely enable chapter 
774 to accomplish its objective of providing sufficient low and moderate 
income housing for the Commonwealth, amendment of the statute is 
needed to guarantee the input of sound advance planning into decision-
making as to the location and design of the subsidized housing. Only 
then will there be any assurance that the low and moderate income hous-
ing which is built under chapter 774 will be constructed on the land 
most suitably adapted for that purpose.lll 
The Massachusetts "Anti-Snob Zoning Law" was passed by the General 
Court in 1969 in response to the need for low and moderate income 
housing in the belief that a major hindrance to the construction of such 
housing was the use by cities and towns of "exclusionary" or "snob" 
zoning devices, which tended to "zone out" of some communities indi-
viduals and families with low and moderate incomes. In 1967, Senate 
Order No. 95518 directed the Legislative Research Council to 
undertake a study and investigation relative to the feasibility and 
implications of restricting the zoning power to cities and county 
governments with particular emphasis on the possibility that the 
smaller communities are utilizing the zoning power in an unjust 
manner with respect to minority groups.tT 
The Council's Report, issued in 1968, studied the economic effects of 
eight restrictive zoning devices (minimum lot size requirements, ·"green 
space" zoning, minimum frontage and setback requirements, building 
height limitations, maximum floor area requirements, inspection and 
permit fees, and maximum buildable areas of lots) and concluded that 
all but the last had a significant negative impact on the construction of 
low and moderate income housing.18 The Council stressed that large lot 
zoning, for example, was being used increasingly as a zoning tool and 
that unless kept within sound planning limits, it not only resulted in 
large lots unaffordable to low and moderate income home purchasers,te 
but also increased the competition for, and the prices of, available 
111 For a further examination of chapter 774, see Note, The Massachusetts Zoning 
Appeals Law: First Breach in the Exclusionary Wall, 54 B.U.L Rev. 57 (1974). 
18 See 1967 J. Senate 654. · 
17 1967 Senate Order No. 933, quoted in Report of the Legislative Research 
Council Relative to Restricting the Zoning Power to City and County Governments, 
Senate Doc. No. 1155 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Research Council Report]. 
18 Legislative Research Council Report, supra note 17, at 90-119. 
19 But d. L Sagalyn Be G. Sternlieb, Zoning and Housing Costs: The Impact of 
Land-Use Controls on Housing Price 48, 52 (1973) (in which the authors cite empirical 
data indicating that house size and the socioeconomic make-up of a municipality are 
more significant variables in explaining selling price variation than is minimum lot 
size regulation. See generally Note, 45 Notre Dame Law. 123 (1969); Note, 15 Syracuse 
L. Rev. 507, 514-17 (1965). . 
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smaller lots, as well as rapidly depleting the supply of land available for 
future development.2o 
In June 1969, the Committee on Urban Affairs, in its Report on 
House Bill No. 5429, found that the shortage of low and moderate in-
come housing constituted an "emergency" situation and emphasized that 
the solution to the problem could not come about solely within the con-
fines of the densely populated cities. Land in less densely populated areas 
would also have to be made available.21 What was needed was a limita-
tion on the use of zoning devices to exclude low and moderate income 
housing from individual towns, a legislative mandate that the regional 
need22 for low-cost housing be considered by local planning boards and 
20 Legislative Research Council Report, supra note 17, at 16-17. 
21 Report of Committee on Urban Affairs on House Bill No. 5429 (1969), reprinted 
in Rules and Regulations, Massachusetts Communities and Development, Rules and 
Regulations for the Conduct of Hearings by the Housing Appeals Committee, at 1 n.l. 
(1971). [hereinafter cited as Housing Appeals Committee Rules and Regulations]. 
22 Calls for a "regional approach" to land use planning to prevent individual 
municipalities from considering only local needs while disregarding those of the region 
in general, have been frequent in recent years. See, e.g., Feiler, Metropolitanization 
and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 655 (1971): 
Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 
1966 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 1!1; Note, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251 (1966). There has also been 
considerable discussion of the possibility that exclusionary zoning may run into con-
stitutional problems with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because of its detrimental effect beyond the zoned community's boundaries. See Note, 
Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1645 (1971); Note, The 
Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 Yale L.J. 896 (1970). 
The suggestion, however, that there is a limit to how far local zoning can go in 
ignoring regional considerations is not new. Feiler points out that in Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the landmark case in which the Supreme Court upheld 
the general constitutionality of a local zoning ordinance, the Court paused to warn that 
it could conceive of situations in which the municipal interest in zoning would have 
to bow to larger public interests: "It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the 
possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the 
interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in 
its way." 272 U.S. at !190. Few courts, however, have invalidated local zoning schemes 
for being at odds with the needs of the larger region. The notable exception is the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which has established a general rule that communities 
may not refuse to confront the problems of population growth by adopting zoning 
regulations that effectively restrict population to near present levels, and has con-
sistently struck down zoning schemes that have an exclusionary purpose or result. See, 
e.g., Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 4!19 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 
4!17 Pa. 2!17, 26!1 A.2d !195 (1970); National Land &: Inv. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
Massachusetts cases have at times referred to the principle that municipal restrictions 
which conflict with the general public interest cannot be allowed to stand. Thus, in 
Simon v. Town of Needham, !Ill Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942), involving the 
validity of a one acre minimum lot size requirement, the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated in the course of its opinion: 
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up a barrier against 
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legislative bodies to determine the permissible land uses in various 
districts. 
The approach ultimately taken by the Legislature in its attempt to 
curb the exclusionary housing practices of cities and towns, and to 
facilitate the construction of low and moderate income housing in the 
Commonwealth is contained in chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969.23 The 
chapter sets up a procedure whereby "any public agency or limited divi-
dend or nonprofit organization proposing to build low or moderate 
income housing"24 may submit to a local board of appeals a single 
application for a comprehensive permit to construct such housing.211 
The statute thus eliminates, in the case of an applicant proposing to 
build low or moderate income housing, the necessity of procuring sepa-
rate permits from a number of different local agencies before beginning 
the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens who desire to live there and who 
are able and willing to erect homes upon lots upon which fair and reasonable 
restrictions have been imposed nor for the purpose of protecting the large estates 
that are already located in the district. The strictly local interests of the town 
must yield if it appears that they are plainly in conflict with the general interests 
of the public at large ...• 
311 Mass. at 565-66, 42 N.E.2d at 519. For the most part, however, the court in Simon 
paid little heed to the task of balancing the interests of the Town of Needham with 
the interests of the Boston metropolitan area and of those who might want to move 
into Needham, and concentrated instead on balancing the individual plaintiff's interest 
in being free to develop his land in lots of less than one acre against the interest of 
the other residents of the district in having freedom from congestion, better oppor-
tunity for rest and relaxation, good children's play facilities and the chance "to 
attempt something in the way of flowers, shrubs, and vegetables." Id. at 563, 42 N.E.2d 
at 518. Under this latter test the one acre minimum lot size requirement was upheld. 
Id. at 567, 42 N.E.2d at 520. In Aronson v. Town of Sharon, !146 Mass. 598, 195 
N.E.2d !141 (1964), where the issue was the validity of a 100,000 square foot minimum 
lot size, the court invoked the "law of diminishing returns" and held that attainment 
of the advantages of large lot size cited in Simon did not reasonably require lots of 
100,000 square feet. ld. at 604, 195 N.E.2d at 345. The court's decision was based, how-
ever, not on the exclusionary effect of the 100,000 square foot minimum, but rather 
on the conclusion that the minimum lot size here, inspired as it was by a desire to 
encourage land to be kept and used for purposes of conservation, constituted a 
"taking" of private property without compensation. Id. 
23 Chapter 774, §§I and 2 are contained in G.L c. 40B, §§20-23 and G.L. c. 2!lB, §5A. 
24 G.L. c. 40B, §21. "Low or moderate income housing" is defined as 
any housing subsidized by the federal or state government under any program 
to assist the construction of low or moderate income housing as defined in the 
applicable federal or state statute, whether built or operated by any public agency 
or any nonprofit or limited dividend organization. 
G.L., c. 40B, §20. The legislation itself does not define "limited dividend organization." 
However, the Department of Community Affairs has defined the term to mean any 
applicant other than a public agency which proposes to sponsor housing under Chapter 
40B and is eligible to receive a subsidy from a state or federal agency after a com-
prehensive permit has been issued. Housing Appeals Committee Rules and Regulations, 
supra note 21, Rule l(f) at 2. 
211 G.L c. 40B, §21. 
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construction. In this sense, chapter 774 represents a "streamlined" version 
of the ordinary procedure of obtaining the requisite zoning and con-
struction permits. 
If an application for a comprehensive permit filed under section 21 
of chapter 40B is denied by the board of appeals, or is granted with 
such conditions and requirements as to make the building or operation 
of such housing "uneconomic,"26 the applicant is given the right to 
appeal to the Housing Appeals Committee in the Department of Com-
munity Affairs for a review of the board's denial or conditional grant 
of the permit.27 Section 23 of chapter 40B states that the review by the 
Housing Appeals Committee shall be limited to the issue of whether, 
in the case of the denial of an application, the decision of the board of 
appeals was "reasonable and consistent with local needs."28 If the com-
mittee determines that the Board's denial was "unreasonable and not 
consistent with local needs," it must vacate the board's decision and 
direct the board to issue a comprehensive permit to the applicant.29 In 
the case of an approval of an application with conditions and require-
ments imposed, the committee must determine whether the conditions 
and requirements "make the construction or operation of such housing 
uneconomic and whether they are consistent with local needs."80 If the 
committee finds that the conditions imposed do make the construction 
or operation of the housing "uneconomic" and at the same time are not 
consistent with local needs, it shall order the board of appeals to modify 
or remove the condition so as to make the proposal no longer "uneco-
nomic.''31 The "consistent with local needs" test takes precedence over 
the "uneconomic" test in these situations, and if the "decisions or con-
. ditions and requirements" imposed by a board of appeals are consistent 
with local needs, they "shall not be vacated, modified or removed by 
the committee notwithstanding that such decisions or conditions and 
requirements have the effect of making the applicant's proposal un-
26 Any condition "brought about by any single factor or combination of factors" 
is deemed "uneconomic" 
to the extent that it makes it impossible for a public agency or a nonprofit or-
ganization to proceed in building or operating low or moderate income housing 
without finandal loss, or for a limited dividend corporation to proceed and still 
realize a reasonable return in building or operating such housing within the 
limitations set by the subsidizing agency of government .•.. 
G.L. c. 40B, §20 (emphasis added). 
27 See G.L. c. 40B, §22, quoted in note 4 supra. 
28 G.L c. 40B, §2!J, quoted in note 5 supra. 
29 Id. 
80 G.L c. 40B, §2!J. 
Sl Id. The test of whether the condition or requirement renders the proposal 
"uneconomic" will vary according to the applicant. See G.L. c. 40B, §20, quoted in 
note 26 supra. 
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economic."82 The statute likewise makes it clear that in no event shall 
the committee issue any order that would allow low and moderate in-
come housing to be built or operated "in accordance with standards 
less safe than the applicable building and site plan requirements of the 
Federal Housing Administration or the Massachusetts Housing Finance 
Agency, whichever agency is financially assisting such housing."88 
The key to chapter 774 is its definition of "consistent with local needs," 
which, in effect, requires cities and towns to take into account the 
regional need for low and moderate income housing, as well as tradi-
tional local planning objectives, in establishing local zoning restrictions 
and in passing on applications for comprehensive permits under chap-
ter 774. Section 20 of chapter 40B states: 
[R]equirements and regulations shall be considered consistent with 
local needs if they are reasonable in view of the regional need for 
low and moderate income housing considered with the number of 
low income persons in the city or town affected and the need to 
protect the health or safety of the occupants of the proposed hous-
ing or of the residents of the city or town, to promote better site 
and building design in relation to the surroundings, or to preserve 
open spaces, and if such requirements or regulations are applied as 
equally as possible to both subsidized and unsubsidized housing." 
In each case, then, the st~tute calls for a balancing of the regional need 
for low or moderate income housing811 against the number of low income 
persons likely to take advantage of the new faCility and against certain 
valid planning objections to the proposed oonstruction. Moreover, since 
one objective of the "anti-snob zoning" provisions of chapter 774 was 
to force communities to share the burden of supplying enough low and 
moderate income housing for the region, the statute provides that once 
a municipality has bUilt a specified amount of low and moderate income 
housing, "requirements or regulations" imposed on the construction or 
operation of further low and moderate income housing shall be deemed 
"consistent with local needs."86 
32 G.L. c. 40B, §2!1. 
33 Id. 
34 G.L. c. 40B, §20. 
811 The statute nowhere defines the "regional need for low and moderate income 
housing." However, Rule l(g) of the Housing Appeals Committee's Rulei and Regula-
tions provides that: 
"Regional Need" means the shortage of housing [for] families and individuals with 
incomes within the eligibility limits of the State or Federal Program subsidizing 
the proposed housing for the entire Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of 
which the city or town is part, as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census; or 
if the city or town lies outside any such area for the entire ·regional planning 
district created by Chapter 40B of the General Laws, or any other special act. 
Housing Appeals Committee Rules and Regulations, supra note 21, Rule l(g), at 2. 
86 G.L. c. 40B, §20. The statute states that requirements or regulations imposed 
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The major problem with chapter 774 is what it omitted-a clear 
statement that both the Housing Appeals Committee and local boards 
of appeals have the power to override local zoning ordinances or by-
laws. Commentators early recognized this major ambiguity in the statute 
as passed.37 One writer has pointed out that while the statute creates the 
impression that zoning can be varied if the board of appeals so desires, 
the language of the statute does not expressly confer such power.8B Under 
the literal language of the Act,· therefore, boards of appeals seem to have 
only those powers which they normally possess in zoning matters, 
which powers do not include broad authority to override local zoning 
restrictions. 39 
It is clear that the drafters of the "Anti-Snob Zoning Law" intended 
that local boards of appeals would, under the act, have the power, 
and in many cases the duty, to override local zoning ordinances which 
would prevent construction of low and moderate income housing.4o 
Without the existence of such a power on the part of local boards, the 
purposes of chapter 774 could be wholly frustrated. Section 23 of chap-
by a local board of appeals will be deemed consistent with local needs if: (I) low or 
moderate income housing already existing in the city or town is either (a) in excess of 
ten percent of the housing units reported in the latest decennial census of the city 
or town or (b) located on sites comprising at least one and one-half percent of the 
total land area zoned for residential, commercial or industrial use; or (2) the applica-
tion before the board would result in the commencement of construction of low and 
moderate income housing, in any one calendar year, on sites comprising more than 
three-tenths of one percent of the total land area in the city or town zoned for 
residential, commercial or industrial use, or ten acres, whichever is larger. G.L., c. 
40B, §20. In computing the total land area zoned for residential, commercial or 
industrial use, the statute directs that land owned by the United States, the 
Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, the Metropolitan District Com-
mission or any "public authority" shall not be taken into account. Id. These 
provisions were intended to completely exempt a board of appeals in a community 
satisfying the "minimum housing obligations" described above from the possibility of 
overruling by the Housing Appeals Committee under G.L. c. 40B, §23. See Rodgers, 
Snob Zoning in. Massachusetts, 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 487, 490. Cf. 1973 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 514-15, 294 N.E.2d at 41!1. 
37 Rodgers, supra note !16, at 491; Note, Snob Zoning Developments in Massachusetts 
and New Jersey, 7 Harv. J. Legis. 246, 263 (1970); Huber, Land Use Law §14.1, 1969 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 360, !162. 
38 Huber, supra note !17. 
39 The powers and duties of boards of appeals are outlined in G.L. c. 40A, §15. 
The board's power to override local zoning is narrowly circumscribed by the variance 
procedures described in §15, and the board of appeals does not have the power to 
nullify acts of the local legislative body charged with the adoption and amendment 
of zoning ordinances. Bearce v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 351 Mass. 316, 319, 219 N.E.2d 
15, 17 (1966). 
40 Allan G. Rodgers, one of the principal draftsmen of chapter 774, has pointed out 
that "it was clearly the intention of the sponsors of the act to give the boards this 
power [to override zoning ordinances or by-laws], but a legislative preamble so stating, 
and other suitable language, were eliminated as the bill passed through the legislative 
labyrinth." Rodgers, supra note !16, at 491. See also text at notes 42-51 infra. 
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ter 40B states that the Housing Appeals Committee shall vacate a 
decision of a board of appeals denying a comprehensive permit if it 
finds that the decision of the board was "unreasonable and not consistent 
with local needs."41 But if a board of appeals did not have the authority 
to override a zoning ordinance effectively prohibiting the use of any 
land within a town for low and moderate income housing, how could 
the board's refusal to ignore the zoning restriction ever be termed "un-
reasonable" by the Housing Appeals Comniittee?42 If chapter 774 were 
to be construed to confer no power on local boards to override zoning 
ordinances or by-laws, a city or town could completely avoid the effects 
of the statute, and its obligation to share at least some of the burden of 
providing low and moderate income housing for the region, simply by 
setting up a zoning scheme which prohibited all construction of .multi-
family housing within its boundaries. 
Although the drafters of chapter 774 could not have intended that 
the purposes of the statute could so easily be frustrated, the Concord 
Board argued that changes made in House Bill No. 5429 (the Urban 
Affairs draft) by the Committee on Ways and Means eliminated the 
original intent to circumvent exclusionary zoning provisions. In the 
Urban Affairs draft, the provisions [now part of section 23 of chapter 
40B] concerning the Housing Appeals Committee's review of the grant-
ing of a comprehensive permit subject to conditions making the proposal 
"uneconomic" read: 
(T]he committee shall, unless the action of the board of appeals 
is found to be consistent withlocal needs, order such board to issue 
any necessary permit or approval or to modify or remove any re-
quirement, including but not limited to zoning or building code 
requirements. 48 
The Ways and Means draft (House Bill No. 5581), ultimately enacted 
by the Legislature, eliminated the phrase emphasized above, the final 
version providing that the committee "shall order such board to modify 
or remove any such condition or requirement . . • and to issue any 
necessary permit or approval."" The brief of the Concord Board noted, 
furthermore, that subsequent unsuccessful attempts had been made by 
41 G.L. c. 40B, §2!1. 
42 See Rodgers, supra note !16, at 491 n.l!l. But some have expressed the opinion that 
the term "reasonable" in the phrase "reasonable and consistent with local needs" in 
G.L., c. 40B, §2!1 is mere surplusage. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court in Hanover 
characterized the term "reasonable" as "surplus verbiage which does not add any 
substance to the 'consistent with local needs' standard." 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
514 n.17, 294 N.E.2d at 415 n.17. See G.L, c. 40B, 120. quoted in text at note !14 supra. 
48 1969 Mass. Ugis. Doc. House No. 5429, quoted in 197!1 Mass. Adv, Sh. at 500, 
294 N.E.2d at 405 (court's emphasis). 
44 G.L., c. 40B, §2!1. 
63
Huber: Chapter 12: Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
§12.80 LAND USE 465 
individual legislators to "correct" weaknesses in the statute by amending 
it to provide that boards of appeals or a state agency would have the 
power to override local zoning by-laws.~ 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Concord Board's argument 
that the changes in the bill made by the Committee on Ways and Means 
indicated a legislative intent to deny the Housing Appeals Committee 
and boards of appeals the power to vary "requirements and regulations" 
in the form of zoning ordinances. The court characterized the deletion 
of the phrase "including but not limited to zoning or building code 
requirements" as an insignificant elimination of "superfluous" language.46 
The court noted that the title carried by the bill in the Urban Affairs 
draft-"An Act providing for the construction of low or moderate in-
come housing in cities and towns and for relief from local restrictions 
hampering such construction"41-was unchanged in the Ways and 
Means redraft. 48 The court also deemed significant the fact that op~ 
nents of the bill had unsuccessfully attempted to attach amendments 
to it which would have made its provisions inapplicable to any town 
which refused to accept it, a move which, according to the court, "would 
not have been necessary if local zoning powers were to remain inviolate 
under the new law . . . ."49 
From all of the above circumstances, the court concluded that the 
legislative intent behind chapter 774 was to provide relief from ex-
clusionary zoning practices which prevented construction of low and 
moderate income housing.11o Stating that the language of the statute 
must be construed in a manner which would effectuate this intent, the 
court held that the phrase "requirements and regulations" (in that 
portion of section 20 of chapter 40B which defines "consistent with local 
needs") includes within its scope zoning ordinances and by-laws.111 Hav-
ing concluded that the Housing Appeals Committee has the power, under 
section 2!J of chapter 40B, to override zoning requirements which are 
not consistent with local needs, the court stated that this power must 
of necessity reside also in the boards of appeals. Otherwise, stated the 
411 Brief of Petitioner Board of Appeals of Conmrd at 26, Board of Appeals v. 
Housing Appeals Comm. The Conmrd Board's brief cited in support of its argument 
the specific rejection or non-passage of 1971 Mass. Legis. Doc. House Nos. 5700, 5854, 
and 2162, and 1972 Mass. Legis. Doc. House No. 144!1. Id. 
48 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 501, 294 N.E.2d at 405. 
47 1969 Mass. Legis. Doc. House No. 5429, quoted in 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 501, 
294 N.E.2d at 405 (emphasis added). 
48 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 501, 294 N.E.2d at 405. The murt mncluded that "[s]ince 
the title to a statute may be mnsidered in its mnstruction, the identical titles suggest 
that no major change of substance was intended by the redrafting of the Committee on 
Ways and Means." Id. (citation omitted). 
49 Id. at 502, 294 N .E.2d at 406. 
110 Id. 
Ill Id. at 502-08, 294 N.E.2d at 406. 
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court, an applicant's hearing before the board of appeals would be a 
"futile procedure" in every case in which the proposed housing is not 
permitted by the local zoning ordinance.t12 The court further held that 
the portion of section 21 of chapter 40B which states that the board of 
appeals "shall have the same power to issue permits or approvals as 
any local board or official who would otherwise act with respect to such 
application ... "118 could not be read to exclude the board's power to 
override local "requirements and regulations;"ll4 
It is submitted that the Supreme Judicial Court's decision that chap-
ter 774 does confer on both the Housing Appeals Committee and on 
local boards the power to override zoning regulations which are not 
consistent with local needs was correct both from the standpoint of 
statutory construction and public policy. Any other decision would have 
severely frustrated the statute's dual purpose of facilitating the con-
struction of low and moderate income housing in Massachusetts and 
insuring that the burden of accommodating such housing would not 
be borne solely by those municipalities whose zoning already permitted 
construction of such housing. 
One might argue that chapter 774 should be construed narrowly, as 
112 Id. at 50!1, 294 N.E.2d at 406-07. 
118 G.L c. 40B, §21. When reference is made in the statute to a "local board," it 
means 
any town or city board of survey, board of health, board of subdivision oontrol 
appeals, planning board, building inspector or the officer or board having super-
vision of the construction of buildings or the power of enforcing municipal 
building laws, or city council or board of selectmen. 
G.L c. 40B, §20. 
M 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 50!1, 294 N.E.2d at 407. The court's decision that since 
the statute gives the Housing Appeals Committee the power to override local zoning 
restrictions that are not consistent with local needs, it must be construed to give 
the same power to local boards of appeals and its decision not to read the language 
of §21 as a limitation on this power are eminently sensible and are in accordance with 
the practice of avoiding construction of statutory language which would produce 
irrational results. See Johnson v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, !155 Mass. 94, 99, 24!1 
N.E.2d 157, 160 (1968). But cf. Miller v. Emergency Housing Comm'n, !1!10 Mass. 69!1, 
116 N.E.2d 66!1 (195!1), in which the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that under 
Acts of 1946, c. 592 (repealed by Acts of 195!1, c. 284), which established the Emergency 
Housing Commission and an appeals procedure similar to that in chapter 774, the 
authority of the commission and that of the boards of appeals were not coextensive. 
The boards of appeals went permitted to grant variances only where a literal en-
forcement of the law would involve "substantial hardship to the appellant;" the 
Emergency Housing Commission was authorized to grant variances wherever doing 
80 would alleviate the housing shortage. Id. at 697-98, 116 N.E.2d at 666 (195!1). 
The difference in result between Miller and Hanover is largely attributable to differ-
ences in the language of the two housing statutes. It should be noted that .the ex-
tensive statutory construction which the Hanover court engaged in is not so much an 
indication of "judicial legislating'' on the part of the oourt as it is a measure of the 
extensive ambiguities oontained in the statutory procedures established by the Legisla-
ture. 
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an exception to the general zoning rules and procedures described in 
chapter 40A or as an "exception" to the home rule powers of cities 
and towns under Article 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution.llll 
However, the statute must be construed at least broadly enough so as to 
prevent its purposes from being thwarted. At a minimum, this would 
seem to require a construction of the statute which includes a power in 
both the Housing Appeals Committee and in local boards of appeals 
to override zoning regulations that are not "consistent with local needs," 
as defined by the statute. 
The Hanover court's judicial "gloss" on chapter 774 represents a 
significant departure from the traditional functions of the zoning board 
of appeals. The authority of boards of appeals to modify the effect of 
zoning regulations has historically been circumscribed by the procedures 
for the granting of variances, described in section 15 of chapter 40A. 
The power to grant variances has been narrowly construed in theoryli6 
if not in practice, and courts in the past have scrupulously insisted on 
maintaining a clear distinction between the functions of the board of 
appeals and those of the city council, board of selectmen or other legis-
lative body.117 Moreover, amendments of zoning ordinances or by-laws 
1111 Actually, chapter 774 is consistent with the Home Rule Amendment. The Home 
Rule Amendment did not grant to cities and towns the right to legislate on local 
matters in complete disregard of the legislative policy of the state. Section 6 of the 
Amendment makes dear that the right of home rule was subject to limitations: 
Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordi-
nances or by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general court has 
power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws 
enacted by the general court in conformity with powers reserved to the general 
court by section eight. 
Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §6 (emphasis added). Art. LXXXIX, §8 provides that 
[t]he general court shall have the power to act in relation to cities and towns ... 
by general laws which apply alike to all cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and 
towns, or to a class of not fewer than two. • • • -
Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §8. The court in Hanover held that chapter 774 
is such a "general law" sanctioned by the Home Rule Amendment. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 508-09, 294 N.E.2d at 409-10. Therefore, under the terms of the Home Rule Amend-
ment itself, cities and towns have no power to pass wning ordinances or by-laws which 
would frustrate or be inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 774. Mass. Const. 
amend. art. LXXXIX. §§6, 8; see 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 508-09, 294 N.E.2d at 410. 
See generally Brown, Home Rule in Massachusetts: Municipal Freedom and Legislative 
Control, 58 Mass. LQ. 29, !17-39 (1973); Note, State and Municipal Government: Home 
Rule, 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 264. 
1111 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Board of Appeals, !146 Mass. 81, 84, 190 N.E.2d 8!1, 85 (1963); 
Hurley v. Kolligian, !1!13 Mass. 170, 173, 129 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1955). 
117 See, e.g., Bearce v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 351 Mass. 316, 319-20, 219 N.E.2d 
15, 17 (1966) (a board of appeals does not have the power to nullify or to assess the 
validity of acts of the local legislative body which is charged with the adoption and 
amendment of zoning ordinances); Russell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 349 Mass. 532, 536, 
209 N.E.2d !137, 3!19 (1965) (roning board of appeals exceeded its authority in granting 
to municipal housing authority a variance permitting the construction of a low-rent 
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require a two-thirds vote of the local legislative body.IIS The advantage 
lent to the status quo'l& in the past by this requirement and by the 
narrow construction of the powers of the zoning board of appeals has 
been reversed, at least as far as low and moderate income housing is 
concerned, by chapter 774 and its interpretation in Hanover. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has thus supplied the boards of appeals 
and the Housing Appeals Committee with the powers necessary to 
enable the ambiguous language of chapter 774 to accomplish its apparent 
purpose. The Hanover. decision, by rendering exclusionary zoning 
schemes ineffective, increases the likelihood that low and moderate in-
come housing will now be built in cities and towns formerly able to 
prevent construction of such housing within their borders.60 But ques-
tions remain as to where the housing will be built, and as to how suc-
cessful chapter 774 can ever be in guaranteeing that the housing will 
be constructed on the most suitable land available. 
The Hanover court stressed, at one point in its opinion,61 what one 
of the draftsmen of chapter 774 had earlier stated62,_that the value of 
section 20's alternative definitions of when local "requirements arid 
regulations" shall be considered "consistent with local needs"68 is that 
they "define precisely the municipality's minimum housing obligations 
'under the statute and permit it to do some intelligent, long-range plan-
ning about how and where the necessary housing should be built.' "64 
The idea has considerable merit. A municipality is put on notice by 
chapter 774 that it is under a duty to provide its "fair share" of the 
low and moderate income housing needed by the region. Knowing this 
and knowing that attempts to avoid this duty through the use of exclu-
sionary zoning devices will be fruitless, the municipality can begin to 
take positive steps to plan ahead the location and even the physical 
nature of the housing. 
This prediction of successful advance planning for low and moderate 
housing project for the elderly with provision for one-sixth as many parking spaces 
as required by the town's zoning by-law, such modification of the by-law being 
essentially a legislative function): Colabuf!llo v. Board of Appeal, !186 Mass. 2lll, 214-15, 
14!1 N.E.2d 5!16, 5!18-39 (1957) (city ordinance which purported to enable the Board 
of Aldermen to grant a variance was invalid, as in mnfl.ict with the enabling statute). 
118 G.L. c. 40A, §7. 
1111 See Rodgers, supra note !6, at 487-88. 
60 Numerous other factors unrelated to zoning (e.g., the status of government 
housing subsidies and emnomic mnditions in the mnstruction industry) will, of murse, 
directly affect the rate at which low and moderate income housing is built. The 
impact of such variables, however, is beyond the smpe of this article. 
81 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 514, 294 N.E.2d at 4lll. 
82 Rodgers, supra note !16, at 490. 
68 See note !6 supra. 
64 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 514, 294 N.E.2d at 41!1, quoting Rodgers, supra note !16, at 
490. 
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income housing might even be fulfilled in some communities where the 
planning board, for instance, approved individual sites for low and 
moderate income housing and invited developers to begin construction 
on the sites chosen. The language of the statute, however, does nothing 
to guarantee that such advance planning will take place. There is no 
provision that limits public agencies or nonprofit or limited dividend 
organizations proposing to build low and moderate income housing to 
sites previously approved for such housing.811 If such developers, public 
or private, do find an acceptable site specifically zoned for low and 
moderate income housing, and are thus spared the costly procedure of 
an appeal to the Housing Appeals Committee, it will be a fortuitous 
result, rather than one guaranteed by chapter 774. If the developer is 
forced to pursue the route of appeal to the committee, the "planning 
decision" as to the construction of low and moderate income housing 
will ultimately be made on an ad hoc basis by a committee of five88 
which will have had only a relatively brief period61 in which to study 
possible problems as to the suitability of the site for the proposed con-
struction and which will have taken no account of the possible avail-
ability of more suitable sites within the same town.68 
It is not surprising that the drafters of the "Anti-Snob Zoning Law" 
were apparently unwilling to allow local officials to dictate where low 
and moderate income housing could be located, it being anticipated that 
some local officials. would be tempted to relegate low and moderate in-
811 1974 Mass. Legis. Doc. House No. 961, approved by the Joint Committee on 
Urban Affairs, would amend c. 774 to allow cities and towns to restrict subsidized 
housing to particular locations 
if, with respect to the municipality's plan designating sites for low and moderate 
income housing, "there is in effect a certification by the commissioner [of com-
munity affairs] to the clerk of the city or town that the city or town is currently 
meeting its local need for low and moderate income housing and its fair share of 
the regional need for such housing, or that state and local requirements and 
regulations applicable to sites designated on the plan for such housing will allow 
such city or town to meet without unreasonable delay its local need and its fair 
share of the regional need for such housing." 
1974 House Bill No. 961, §1. See also Stewart, Making anti-snob zoning workable, 
The Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1974, at 4C, cols. 1, 2 (New England ed.). 
68 See G.L c. 23B, §5A. 
61 G.L. c. 40B, §22 provides that the hearing before the Housing Appeals Committee 
shall be held within twenty days after receipt of the applicant's statement of the 
prior proceedings and the reasons upon which the appeal is based. The final decision 
of the committee is to be rendered within thirty days after termination of the hearing. 
"unless such time shall have been extended by mutual agreement between the com-
mittee and the applicant." Id. 
88 G.L. c. 40B, §23 states that the hearing by the Housing Appeals Committee shall 
be limited to the issues of whether the denial of an application or the "conditions or 
requirements" imposed on the granting of an application are "consistent with local 
needs" and of whether such "conditions or requirements" make the construction or 
operation of the proposed housing "uneconomic." See text at notes 28-31 supra. 
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come housing sites to the "worst" sites in the community. The drafters 
might, however, have provided for review of local decisions as to the 
loca,tion of low and moderate income housing by the state's Regional 
Planning Commissions or for a cooperative effort on the part of the 
Regional Planning Commissions and municipalities in locating and 
designing the most suitable sites for the low and moderate income 
housing.69 The option chosen by the drafters of chapter 774 and by the 
Legislature, however, largely ignored the benefits of enlightened advance 
planning in establishing procedures to aid the construction of low and 
moderate income housing. 
To be sure, chapter 774 is not altogether inattentive to the need for 
a balance between the region's low and moderate income housing re-
quirements and the need to apply sound principles of land-use planning 
in locating sites for the housing. Section 20 of chapter 40B does provide 
that the need "to protect the health or safety of the occupants of the 
proposed housing or of the residents of the city or. town, to promote 
better site and building design in relation to the surroundings, or to 
preserve open spaces" will be taken into account in determining whether 
the denial of a comprehensive permit or the granting of a permit with 
"conditions or requirements" imposed thereon is "consistent with local 
needs."7o It seems likely, however, that the perceived need to expedite 
the construction of low and moderate income housing,71 together with 
69 At least one writer has criticized the lack of input, under the act, from the 
Regional Planning Commissions. Note, Snob Zoning Developments in Massachusetts 
and New Jersey, supra note 37, at 264. The writer points out that New York and 
Colorado provide that local zoning regulations must be submitted to a regional or 
state authority before they take effect. Id. at 253 n.'!J'!J. In Colorado, however, the role 
of the state planning department is merely advisory. And in New York a disapproval 
by a regional or state authority may be overridden by a majority plus one of the 
members of the local governing body. Id. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law, Art. 12-B, §239-m 
(McKinney Supp. 1973); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §106-2·21 (1963). 
70 See G.L. c. 40B, §20, quoted in text at note 34 supra. The Supreme Judicial 
Court's decision in Hanover that the Housing Appeals Committee has the power to 
order the issuance of conditional permits and approvals, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 521-22, 
294 N.E.2d at 417-18, also provides a flexibility which allows the committee to take 
principles of land use planning into account in ordering the issuance of comprehensive 
permits. For instance, one of the conditions imposed by the committee on the granting 
of a permit to the Hanover applicant stated: "Before beginning construction the 
Appellant shall provide the Board with satisfactory evidence that its proposed provi-
sions for drainage and sewage disposal have received approval from the appropriate 
state authorities." 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 520 n.22, 294 N.E.2d at 416-17 n.22. 
71 The existence of a perception within the Housing Appeals Committee of the 
need to expedite the construction of low and moderate income housing is arguably 
supported by the committee's decision in the Concord proceeding. There the committee 
recognized "the existence on this site of a serious water problem" and noted that 
[i]t was on this crucial issue, with its attendant problems, actual and potentially 
worsening, of flooding, sewage oveflow (sic), and danger to health and safety of 
occupants of the neighborhood and of the future development, that the [Concord] 
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an understandable sympathy for the applicant who has already invested 
much money in architect's fees, legal fees and possibly in the site itsel£,72 
might lead the Housing Appeals Committee to make this "balance" a 
somewhat uneven one, with the valid planning objections to the con-
struction receiving short shrift. 
One writer, in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, had predicted, 
shortly after passage of chapter 774, that "the decisive criterion for 
review [was] likely to be that of regional need for subsidized housing."73 
Although the language of chapter 40B, section 20 suggests nothing which 
would lead one to conclude that the "regional need for low and mod-
erate income housing" is to be given greater weight than the "need to 
protect the health or safety of the occupants of the proposed housing 
or of the residents of the city or town, to promote better site and build-
ing design in relation to the surroundings, or to preserve open 
spaces ... ," the Hanover court cited the Harvard author and stated: 
In cases where the locality has not met its minimum housing 
obligations, the board must rest its decision on whether the required 
need for low and moderate income housing outweighs the valid 
planning objections to the details of the proposal such as health, 
site design and open spaces . . . . If the regional need for such 
housing outweighs these objections, the board must override any 
restrictive local requirements and regulations which prevent the 
construction of the housing .... However, the municipality's failure 
to meet its minimum housing obligations, as defined in §20, will 
provide compelling evidence that the regional need for housing 
does in fact outweigh the objections to the proposal. See 7 Harv. J. 
on Legislation, 246.74 
Board's decision turned, and the hearing before the Appeals Committee largely 
concerned itself. 
Decision of the Housing Appeals Committee in Concord Home Owning Corp. v. 
Board of Appeals, reprinted in Reservation and Report of the Suffolk County Superior 
Court, Concord Bd. of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., No. 94552 Eq., at 20 (Mar. 
22, 1972). The committee refused to stay the granting of a comprehensive permit until 
further tests could be conducted on the effect the construction would have on the 
subsurface water conditions in the area. See id. at 27, stating, inter alia: 
we are unwilling to follow the line of least resistance by an easy concurrence 
in the Board's decision, insisting on engineering tests ad infinitum, thus assuaging 
the understandable, if unproven fears of the neighbors, and indefinitely postponing 
the day of decision. 
I d. 
72 Note, however, that chapter 774, as read by the Hanover court, does not require 
the applicant seeking a comprehensive permit to establish a present title in the 
proposed site. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 525, 294 N.E.2d at 420. 
78 Note, Snob Zoning Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, supra note 
37, at 260. 
74 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 515, 294 N.E.2d at 413 (emphasis added). 
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Thus the court may well have sanctioned a policy, not evident in the 
language of chapter 774, of considering the valid planning objections 
to the project of secondary importance whenever the town in question 
has not yet fulfilled the "minimum housing obligations" outlined in sec-
tion 20 of chapter 40B. Such an approach, if strictly followed, could 
result in ill-considered decisions to allow construction of low and moder-
ate income housing on land unsuited to the demands of such housing. 
Not only does the court's dictum that failure to meet the "minimum 
housing obligations" outlined in section 20 of chapter 40B will provide 
"compelling evidence" that the valid planning objections to a particular 
project are outweighed by the regional need for low ancl moderate in-
come housing delineate too facile a standard for judging whether re-
quirements and regulations are "consistent with local needs," it is also 
fundamentally defective as a statement of the law. The standard out-
lined by the court derives not from the express language, or even the 
legislative history, of chapter 774, but rather from the prediction of an 
individual commentator as to how the statutory test would be applied 
in practice. It should be read in the narrow context in which it was 
originally uttered despite its reappearance as dictum in the Hanover 
opinion. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in the Hanover case has done 
much to resolve the ambiguities present in the statutory language of 
chapter 774. The court's holding that the Housing Appeals Committee 
and boards of appeals have the power to override local zoning restric-
tions which are not "consistent with local needs" removes a significant 
barrier to the accomplishment of chapter 774's intended purposes-
facilitating the construction of needed low and moderate income hous-
ing in the Commonwealth and spreading the burden of supplying such 
housing among all the cities and towns. 
However, although the Hanover decision insures that low and mod-
erate income housing cannot be blocked by the adoption of exclusionary 
zoning devices on the part of any city or town,711 the nature of the 
appeals procedure established by chapter 774 is such that there is no 
assurance that the low and moderate income housing which is built will 
be constructed on the land most suitably adapted for that purpose. It is 
711 It has recently been observed that a town might be able to avoid the effect of an 
order by the Housing Appeals Committee directing issuance of a comprehensive permit 
for construction of low and moderate income housing by subsequently agreeing with 
the developer holding the permit to rezone the site to allow construction of a shopping 
center, for example, which would offer the developer a larger prospective profit. Stewart, 
Making anti-snob zoning workable, The Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1974, at 
4C, col. ll (New England ed.). The success of such "alternative" attempts to block con· 
struction of low and moderate income housing remains to be seen. However, nothing 
in chapter 774 prevents such "last minute" rezoning. A private developer, moreover, 
cannot be forced to build subsidized housing merely because he has sought and ob-
tained a permit to construct such housing. 
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highly unlikely that the Legislature will be willing at this time to amend 
or replace chapter 774 to guarantee the input of sound advance plan-
ning into decision-making as to the location and design of low and 
moderate income housing. Until, however, such changes are made, 
Massachusetts will continue to be endowed with a legislative scheme, 
admittedly innovative, which, while it prevents individual communities 
from excluding low and moderate income housing from their borders, 
also sacrifices sound principles of land use planning in procuring the 
dubious benefits of an expensive procedure of ad hoc review of decisions 
granting or denying individual construction permits for such housing. 
WILLIAM B. RoBERTS 
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